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ABSTRACT 
 
CASH FLOW VERSUS ACCRUAL EXPECTATIONS MANAGEMENT 
TO MEET OR BEAT ANALYST CASH FLOW AND EARNINGS FORECASTS 
 
BY 
 
JOMSURANG RUANGPRAPUN 
 
April 10, 2014 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Siva Nathan 
Major Academic Unit: Accounting 
 
 
Prior literature shows firms manage analysts’ earnings expectations downward to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. Recent studies find an increasing number of analysts forecast both cash flow 
and earnings, providing two explicit targets managers seek to achieve. Nonetheless, the literature 
is unclear on whether firms manage analysts’ operating cash flow and/or accrual components of 
expected earnings to meet or beat analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts, and which firm 
characteristics motivate firms to engage in the expectations management strategies. This study 
decomposes earnings expectations management into its two mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive parts: cash flow expectations management and accrual expectations management, and 
examines whether cross-sectional differences in the likelihood of firms engaging in downward 
cash flow or accrual expectations management depend on firm-specific characteristics. Overall, I 
find firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-period cash flow forecasts 
engage in downward cash flow expectations management, and these firms engage in downward 
cash flow expectations management over and above downward accrual expectations 
management. I also find firms with better financial health, larger market shares, lower 
institutional ownership and less bloated balance sheets are likely to walk down both analysts’ 
cash flow and accrual forecasts.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The accounting literature (Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al. 2002; Roychowdhury 2006; 
Gunny 2010) identifies three mechanisms firm managers use to avoid negative earnings 
surprises: (1) real earnings management, (2) accrual earnings management and (3) earnings 
expectations management.1,2 While the earnings management literature has extensively examined 
how firms manipulate accruals and operating cash flows to meet or beat earnings and cash flow 
forecasts, it is unclear whether firms manage analysts’ expectations using the operating cash flow 
or accrual components of expected earnings.3 Moreover, there is no empirical evidence on firm-
specific characteristics that motivate managers to walk down the cash flow versus accrual 
components of expected earnings. Much of the prior literature focuses on downward earnings 
expectations management. However, if managers pay attention to the separate cash flow and 
accrual components of earnings and make decisions to walk down analysts’ earnings forecasts 
via cash flows and accruals independently or jointly, it is important for researchers and 
practitioners to understand the nature and determinants of downward earnings expectations 
management via cash flows and accruals. In particular, researchers should consider the 
differential effect of cash flow versus accrual expectations management when examining the 
association between earnings expectations management and the probability of meeting or beating 
                                                             
1 Managers engage in the first two mechanisms by manipulating real operating activities or accrual estimates 
upwards respectively to increase reported earnings. In contrast, managers engage in earnings expectations 
management by utilizing public and/or private communication channels to guide analysts’ earnings forecasts 
downwards to a beatable level without affecting reported earnings directly. 
2 McVay (2006) proposes classification shifting as another earnings management tool. I focus on the accrual versus 
cash flow-based tools that managers use to meet or beat earnings and cash flow forecasts, and therefore, I do not 
examine classification shifting of items within the income statement. 
3 I use the terms real earnings management, real operating activities, and operating cash flow management 
synonymously throughout the manuscript. 
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analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts. As for practitioners, while investors could monitor 
which firms are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow and/or accrual forecasts and make 
investing decisions accordingly, analysts can better anticipate management guidance of earnings 
components and make cash flow and/or accrual forecast revisions more accurately. 
Because earnings are the sum of accruals and operating cash flows (Sloan 1996), firms 
can manage analysts’ expectations via operating cash flows and/or accruals in order to meet or 
beat analyst cash flow and/or accrual forecasts.4 I therefore decompose earnings expectations 
management (EXM) into its two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive components: 
cash flow expectations management (CXM) and accrual expectations management (AXM).5 
Consistent with prior research on EXM (Matsumoto 2002, Bartov et al. 2002), I define CXM 
(AXM) as management’s actions to guide analysts’ cash flow (accrual) forecasts downward to 
avoid negative cash flow (accrual) surprises. Downward cash flow (accrual) expectations 
management can be viewed as multi-round negotiations between managers and analysts before 
analysts publish their final forecasts. Therefore, in order to walk down analysts’ forecasts 
successfully, managers must consider firm-specific characteristics while taking into account 
analysts’ willingness to revise their forecasts downwards. 
The following scenarios further illustrate how managers engage in downward cash flow 
or accrual expectations management. Using public and/or private communication channels, 
earnings expectations management via operating cash flows (CXM) may occur via cash receipts 
or cash payments when firm managers suggest analysts’ estimates of cash received from 
                                                             
4 Analysts do not issue accrual forecasts directly. However, when analysts issue both earnings and cash flow 
forecasts, one can infer analysts’ accrual forecasts by subtracting their cash flow forecasts from their earnings 
forecasts.   
5 I use the following terms interchangeably: earnings expectations management via cash flows (accruals), cash flow 
(accrual) expectations management, downward cash flow (accrual) guidance, walking down cash flow (accrual) 
forecasts, and downward CXM (AXM). 
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customers or investments are too high and cash flow forecasts may be adjusted downward. As 
for cash payments, managers may suggest analysts’ estimates of cash paid for inventories, 
salaries, and other operating expenses (e.g., interest on notes payable, income taxes, insurance) 
are too low and should be adjusted upward. Revising cash receipts downward or cash payments 
upward should lead to lower cash flow forecasts. Earnings expectations management via accruals 
(AXM) occurs when firm managers suggest analysts’ estimates of sales revenue are too high and 
should be adjusted downward because firms offer fewer discounts or more stringent credit terms. 
For services firms, managers may suggest some part of revenue recognition should be delayed 
due to a change in a service term agreement or because services have not been rendered. 
Managers may also suggest analysts’ estimates of operating expenses (e.g., salaries, depreciation, 
amortization, bad debt expenses) or other operating expenses (e.g., impairment losses of long-
lived assets, losses from inventory write-down) are too low and should be accrued upwards. 
Adjustments of revenue accruals downward and expense accruals upward may lead to lower 
accrual forecasts.6  
To motivate the importance of EXM decomposition, I first show that a one percent 
increase in downward CXM (AXM) increases the probability of reported cash flows (accruals) 
meeting or beating analysts’ cash flow (accrual) forecasts by 4% (5%). In addition, I find that 
downward CXM rather than downward AXM helps firms to simultaneously meet or beat both 
analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts. Specifically, a one percent increase in downward 
CXM increases the probability of meeting or beating both cash flow and earnings forecasts by 
2%.  
                                                             
6 Figure 1 presents a diagram of downward earnings expectation management via operating cash flows and accruals. 
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I test several hypotheses to provide insights regarding the determinants of and the trade-
offs between the use of downward CXM and downward AXM.7  I argue that factors specific to 
firms’ reported operating cash flows (i.e., cash flow growth, prior-period meeting or beating cash 
flow forecasts, and cash flow forecast uncertainty) motivate managers to walk down analysts’ 
cash flow forecasts. Similarly, I contend that factors specific to firms’ reported accruals lead to 
downward accrual expectations management. I also examine whether other firm-specific 
characteristics and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) incentivize managers to use 
downward cash flow and/or accrual expectations management. 
Using a sample of firm-year observations with both analysts’ cash flow and earnings 
forecasts between 1995 and 2010, I find that firms engaging in downward CXM tend to: (1) have 
lower cash flow growth and (2) miss prior-period cash flow forecasts. To be specific, a decline in 
reported operating cash flows from a prior period reduces the probability that firms will meet or 
beat cash flow forecasts in the current period if they have limited abilities to manipulate their 
reported cash flows upwards. Therefore, managers of firms with lower cash flow growth are 
more effective in walking down analysts’ cash flow forecasts than higher cash flow growth 
firms. Similarly, firms that miss prior-period cash flow forecasts may experience difficulty in 
manipulating their reported cash flows upwards to avoid negative cash flow surprises. 
Nonetheless, given the existence of cash flow targets, managers of these firms have stronger 
incentives to walk down cash flow forecasts to a beatable level.  
As for the determinants of downward AXM, I find firms in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) 
period are more (less) likely to engage in downward AXM. My result is consistent with that of 
Bartov et al. (2009) who find a decline (increase) in both accrual management and earnings 
                                                             
7 It is possible that firms manage analysts’ expectations of cash flows and accruals upwards. However, since the 
expectations management literature focuses on downward guidance, I follow the same definition and focus on cases 
where firms engage in downward CXM and/or AXM.  
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expectations management (real earnings management) in the post-SOX period. Despite no direct 
impact on firms’ reported accrual levels, downward AXM involves managing analysts’ 
expectations of accrual estimates which are highly scrutinized by regulators in the post-SOX 
period, so managers may perceive higher costs in walking down analysts’ accrual forecasts in the 
post-SOX period. Unlike downward CXM determinants, I find no association between 
downward AXM and accrual growth or accrual forecast uncertainty. I attribute these results to 
the argument that, compared to analysts’ implied accrual forecasts, analysts’ cash flow forecasts 
are more salient to managers and analysts (e.g., Call et al. 2009, McInnis and Collins 2011). I 
find a positive relation between prior-period meeting or beating accrual forecasts and downward 
AXM but the relationship is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.08).  
I also find firms in better financial condition and firms with market leader status are more 
likely to engage in both downward CXM and downward AXM since the consequence of missing 
either cash flow or accrual targets may be higher for these firms. Firms with lower institutional 
ownership and firms with less bloated balance sheets (i.e., firms with higher accounting 
flexibility) engage in both downward CXM and downward AXM perhaps because they are less 
scrutinized by investors and regulators in general.  
After identifying the determinants of downward CXM and AXM, I examine the trade-off 
between these two strategies. Consistent with my results regarding the determinants of 
downward CXM, I find that the likelihood of firms engaging in downward CXM versus 
downward AXM differs if they have lower cash flow growth and/or miss cash flow forecasts in 
the prior period. In contrast, while I find firms in better financial condition, firms with lower 
institutional ownership and firms with less bloated balance sheets engage in both downward 
CXM and AXM, my results suggest firms with these characteristics are more likely to walk 
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down cash flow than accrual forecasts. Collectively, my results suggest that firm-specific 
characteristics play an important role in explaining management’s use of downward CXM and/or 
AXM in order to meet or beat cash flow and earnings forecasts.  
In addition to the main empirical analyses discussed above, I perform several sensitivity 
analyses to examine whether my results are robust to a different model specification (logistic 
regression model) and/or an alternative measure of downward CXM and downward AXM. I 
address a potential sample selection bias issue that may arise from using a non-random sample of 
firms with analysts’ cash flow forecasts in addition to earnings forecasts through the Heckman 
two-stage procedure (Heckman 1979). Despite slightly weaker results for other firm specific 
factors, my robustness test results are qualitatively similar to results in my main analyses, 
confirming my primary findings that firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior 
period cash flow targets are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow forecasts.  
My study makes two important contributions to the extant literature. First, I provide the 
first evidence on the interplay between the use of downward cash flow and accrual expectations 
management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Second, I provide the first evidence that 
managers differentially walk down accrual and cash flow components of analysts’ earnings 
expectations, suggesting researchers and practitioners should consider the differential effects of 
cash flow and accrual expectations management when examining the association between 
earnings expectations management and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings 
and cash flow forecasts. My research is important to analysts, investors, managers, and 
regulators who are interested in the existence and economic significance of downward earnings 
guidance via cash flows and accruals to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, firm-specific 
characteristics that explain cross-sectional differences in downward cash flow or accrual 
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expectations management, and circumstances where firms are more likely to engage in cash flow 
than accrual expectations management. 
The remainder of my study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses motivations and 
reviews extant literature. Chapter 3 develops hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes my sample 
selection and research design. Chapter 5 presents empirical analyses. Chapter 6 provides 
sensitivity analyses and Chapter 7 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Motivations to decompose earnings expectations management  
Research on cash flow expectations management as a mechanism to meet or beat cash 
flow forecasts is scarce even though empirical findings suggest firms have capital market 
incentives to meet or beat both analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts (e.g., Melendrez et al. 
2008; Brown et al. 2013). To my knowledge, the only study that discusses and models the 
association between analysts’ walking down cash flow forecasts and the likelihood of meeting or 
beating cash flow forecasts is Brown and Pinello (2011) who investigate conditions under which 
firms meet or beat cash flow forecasts but miss earnings forecasts. However, one critical 
assumption which distinguishes cash flow expectations management in my study from Brown 
and Pinello (2011) is that I define total earnings expectations management as the sum of cash 
flow expectations management and accrual expectations management (i.e., EXM = CXM + 
AXM) whereas Brown and Pinello (2011) assume that CXM and EXM are two different 
mechanisms. Moreover, the authors examine only cases where firms engage in CXM but not in 
EXM.  
Prior literature decomposes earnings into operating cash flows and accruals (Sloan 1996), 
suggesting that analysts’ earnings forecasts can be decomposed into cash flow and accrual 
forecasts. To be specific, I propose firm managers use cash flow (accrual) strategies to meet or 
beat analysts’ cash flow (accrual) forecasts.8 Prior literature (Melendrez et al. 2008, Brown et al. 
2013) defines MBBOTH as firms that meet or beat both cash flow (MBC) and earnings forecasts 
(MBE) perhaps, because most analysts do not explicitly provide accrual forecasts and managers 
                                                             
8 Figure 2 summarizes the two cash flow (upward CFO management, downward CXM) and two accrual (upward 
accrual management, downward AXM) management strategies. 
10 
 
view analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts as more salient targets. Therefore, I follow prior 
literature and define MBBOTH similarly in this study.   
As a validation test, I first demonstrate the importance of decomposing EXM into CXM 
and AXM (Appendix B1-2). Similar to prior studies which examine earnings management 
strategies and firm characteristics that affect firms’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Matsumoto 2002, McInnis and Collins 2011),  I model the association 
between cash flow (accrual) management strategies and the probability of meeting or beating 
analysts’ cash flow (accrual) forecasts in Appendix B1.9 Using a sample period between 1995 
and 2010, I find upward CFO management and downward CXM (upward accrual management 
and downward AXM) are used to meet or beat cash flow (accrual) forecasts.10 As for MBBOTH 
(Appendix B2), I find upward CFO management and downward EXM are used to MBBOTH. 
Upward accrual management is negatively associated with MBBOTH. The decomposition model 
provides similar results regarding upward CFO management (positive relation) and upward 
accrual management (negative relation). Downward CXM (AXM) is positively (negatively) 
associated with MBBOTH. This suggests an overall marginal and positive effect of EXM on 
meeting or beating both cash flow and earnings forecasts are driven by downward CXM. 
Specifically, while prior literature shows firms use downward EXM to MBE either 
independently or jointly with other tools, my study shows managers walk down earnings 
forecasts via cash flows to MBBOTH. Because my sample consists of firms with both earnings 
and cash flow forecasts, walking down the cash flow component of earnings (downward CXM) 
alone may help firms meet or beat cash flow and earnings forecasts simultaneously. This 
                                                             
9 While prior studies model the association between downward EXM and MBE, my study models the association 
between downward EXM (downward CXM) [downward AXM] and MBBOTH (MBC) [MBA]. 
10 Because of a high correlation between CXM and AXM (Spearman correlation = 0.57) and ABCFO and ABACC 
(Spearman correlation = 0.25), I orthogonalize these variables before including them in all models. The superscript 
“O” denotes orthogonalized variables. 
11 
 
approach is more effective and less costly than walking down both cash flow and accrual 
forecasts (downward CXM and downward AXM) since walking down accrual forecasts does not 
help firms MBC. Collectively, results from the decomposition models suggest firm managers 
rely on upward CFO management and downward CXM to MBBOTH (marginal effects are 3% 
for ABCFO and 2% for CXM). I interpret these findings as evidence of managers differentially 
walking down separate earnings components.11  
 
2.2 Expectations management literature  
As noted by Bartov et al. (2002), research on earnings expectations management (EXM) 
received more attention after the 1980s from accounting researchers following Brown’s (2001) 
and Matsumoto’s (2002) findings of a significant increase in cases where firms’ actual earnings 
per share are equal to or slightly exceed analysts’ earnings forecasts. This evidence suggests 
firms guide analysts’ earnings forecasts downwards to beatable targets and that this phenomenon 
is pervasive across firms. Consistent with this argument, Matsumoto (2002) finds that firm 
managers use EXM to avoid negative earnings surprises. Similarly, Burgstahler and Eames 
(2006) report managers engage in EXM to avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses. 
Richardson et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence suggesting that capital market incentives 
(e.g., managerial incentives to sell stock after the earnings announcement date) motivate firm 
managers to walk down analyst earnings forecasts to a beatable level.  
One feature that distinguishes earnings expectations management from real and accrual 
earnings management is that firm managers can utilize public and/or private communication to 
guide analysts’ earnings expectations downwards without affecting firms’ reported earnings 
                                                             
11 I do not examine upward cash flow and/or accrual expectations management in this study. However, untabulated 
results suggest managers do not use upward cash flow and/or accrual guidance to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.   
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directly. Prior literature (Richardson et al. 2004, Cotter et al. 2006, Versano and Trueman 2013) 
suggests there are various forms of public communication that managers can use to walk down 
analysts’ forecasts, such as management disclosures of earnings forecasts in press releases and/or 
earnings conference calls. In contrast, private forecast guidance is usually conducted in the form 
of private meetings or phone calls between firm managers and sell-side analysts.  
One way managers engage in public EXM is to issue earnings guidance quarterly and/or 
annually. However, because of short-termism concern (i.e., managers concentrate on meeting or 
beating short-term expectations), the CFA Institute recommends a reform of earnings guidance 
practices by calling for an end to the quarterly earnings guidance (CFA 2006). Since then, 
several studies have examined the benefits, costs and consequences of quarterly earnings 
guidance as a response to the short-termism concern (e.g., Houston et al. 2010, Call et al. 2011, 
Koch et al. 2012). Call et al. (2011) show firms that issue short-term earnings guidance use 
accruals management less often than firms that do not issue earnings guidance, suggesting the 
benefits of quarterly earnings guidance as a substitute for earnings management. In contrast, 
Koch et al. (2012) provide evidence that managers that issue earnings guidance may engage in 
short-termist behavior by using earnings management as a reserve to avoid missing their own 
forecasts, suggesting negative consequences of quarterly earnings guidance as a complement to 
earnings management. Furthermore, after the call to end quarterly earnings guidance, NIRI 
Survey on earnings guidance in 2007 shows more companies provided annual than quarterly 
earnings guidance (NIRI 2007). This suggests firms perceive the growing importance of longer-
term forecasting (annual earnings guidance) than short-term forecasting (quarterly earnings 
guidance), consistent with the CFI Institute’s recommendations. My study examines annual cash 
flow (accrual) forecasts and annual cash flow (accrual) downward guidance to provide evidence 
13 
 
on whether managers use long-term annual cash flow and accrual guidance as a complement to 
or substitute for other earnings management tools.  
A theoretical study by Versano and Trueman (2013) shows private EXM is relatively 
more effective than public EXM for firms to obtain higher post-earnings announcement stock 
prices, and that managers do not engage in public EXM absent private EXM. In other words, 
private information sharing between the manager and the analyst makes the manager more 
informed of how the analyst incorporates the manager’s forecast into the analyst’s own forecast, 
which in turn helps the manager to walk down the analyst’s forecast more effectively. A recent 
survey of sell-side analysts by Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2014) suggests the importance 
of private EXM in practice. For instance, more than half of analyst respondents have direct 
contact with the covered firms’ executives at least five times a year and analysts are pressured to 
walk down their earnings forecasts more than stock recommendations. Using proprietary data of 
executives at a large-cap NYSE-traded firm, Soltes (2014) provides similar evidence that 85% of 
private interactions between management and sell-side analysts are conducted over the phone. 
Collectively, this evidence suggests managers rely on both public and private EXM to meet or 
beat earnings targets.  
The extant literature documents several market consequences from using EXM to achieve 
earnings targets. For example, Bartov et al. (2002) find capital markets reward firms that meet or 
beat analysts’ earnings expectations through EXM after controlling for the period’s earnings 
forecast error. On the other hand, Matsumoto (2002) suggests market penalties for the use of 
EXM. Specifically, she suggests that walking down analysts’ earnings forecasts too early in the 
fiscal period may lead to lower or negative stock prices at the forecast revision and/or earnings 
announcement dates. Das et al. (2011) examine the market consequences of accruals 
14 
 
management and earnings expectation management. Although they find the market premium 
from meeting or beating earnings forecasts (MBE) is discounted for firms that use accrual 
management and EXM either independently or jointly, the net stock price benefit from MBE 
outweighs the cost of doing so. Therefore, the Das et al. (2011) evidence suggests capital market 
incentives exist for firm managers to continue relying on EXM to MBE.  
Because the public and private earnings expectations management are prevalent in the US 
setting, my study contributes to the earnings expectations management literature by further 
examining the existence of downward cash flow and accrual expectations management and firm-
specific characteristics that explain cross-sectional difference in the likelihood of firms engaging 
in downward CXM versus AXM. For instance, while prior literature shows managers use 
quarterly and/or annual downward EXM to meet or beat earnings forecasts, my study shows 
managers engage in annual downward CXM (AXM) to meet or beat both earnings and cash flow 
forecasts (accrual forecasts) accounting for other available earnings management strategies. 
Although I do not distinguish between public and private CXM (AXM), my study suggests 
managers differentially walk down earnings components to meet or beat analysts’ annual 
earnings expectations. In particular, because prior literature (Melendrez et al. 2008; Brown et al. 
2013) finds the capital markets reward firms that MBBOTH, my finding that walking down cash 
flow forecasts helps firms meet or beat both earnings and cash flow forecasts introduces 
downward CXM as an important and effective expectations management strategy for firms with 
certain characteristics (e.g., firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-period 
cash flow forecasts). 
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2.3 Earnings and cash flow management literature  
 In their review of the earnings management literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) 
define earnings management as “managers’ use of judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.” According to Gunny (2010, p.855), earnings 
management can be classified into two categories: accruals management and real activities 
manipulation. Because earnings are the sum of accruals and operating cash flows and because 
investors do not fully adjust their earnings expectations for information in accruals and cash 
flows (Sloan 1996), managers can manipulate accrual and/or cash flow components of total 
earnings in an effort to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Xu et al. 2007). Accruals 
management occurs when managers use accounting discretion within GAAP to choose 
accounting methods and biased estimates to manipulate earnings (Xu et al. 2007, Gunny 2010), 
such as premature revenue recognition, delayed expense recognition, and big bath restructuring 
charges.  
While accruals management has been examined extensively in the accounting literature, 
real earnings management did not receive much attention before Graham et al.’s (2005) survey 
evidence of the prevalence of real activities manipulation in practice and the development of real 
earnings management measures by Roychowdhury (2006). Roychowdhury (2006) defines real 
earnings management (REM) as “departures from normal operational practices, undertaken with 
the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds” (p. 337). Managers can use their 
discretion to cut R&D expenses or offer price discounts as part of their normal operational 
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activities. However, if the level of real activities manipulation is abnormally high, this suggests 
that managers are engaging in REM to meet or beat their earnings targets.  
 Recent cash flow management studies propose several mechanisms firm managers use to 
manipulate reported operating cash flows upward without increasing reported earnings. For 
instance, Lee (2012) shows firms inflate reported CFO through classification shifting and 
transaction timing.12 Frankel et al. (2012) find firms manage non-cash working capital to 
temporarily increase reported CFO in the fourth fiscal quarter.13 Taken together, the evidence 
from the cash flow management literature suggests firm managers have economic incentives to 
manipulate both reported CFO and reported earnings. I find evidence that managers use 
downward CXM (AXM) to MBC (MBA), adding to the earnings and cash flow management 
literatures by demonstrating two important strategies managers use to avoid negative cash flow 
and accrual surprises.  
 
2.4 Analysts’ cash flow forecasts literature  
Sell-side analysts are important financial intermediaries in the capital markets who 
generate research reports such as earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target price 
forecasts (Bradshaw 2002, Asquith et al. 2005, Bradshaw et al. 2013). Prior studies document a 
significant increase in analysts’ provision of operating cash flow forecasts made along with 
earnings forecasts in response to investors’ increased demand for cash flow information (e.g., 
DeFond and Hung 2003, Call 2008, McInnis and Collins 2011). Call et al. (2009) show when 
                                                             
12 Classification refers to shifting items among the statement of cash flow categories (e.g., classifying tax benefits of 
stock options as operating in lieu of financing activities). Timing refers to managers’ use of timing to adjust working 
capital to increase reported CFO (e.g., delaying payments to suppliers or accelerating collections from customers).  
13 Frankel et al. (2012) measure non-cash working capital as: (current assets – cash) – (current liabilities – current 
portion of long-term debt). The authors find a reduction of non-cash working capital in the fourth quarter leads to a 
temporary increase in reported CFO in the fourth quarter. 
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analysts issue cash flow forecasts, their earnings forecasts reflect a better understanding of 
current earnings for future earnings. In contrast, Givoly et al. (2009) find analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts are less accurate and are of lower quality than earnings forecasts.  
Notwithstanding the conflicting views of the quality and accuracy of cash flow forecasts, 
recent studies explore various properties of analysts’ cash flow forecasts including the role of 
cash flow forecasts in encouraging or disciplining managers’ ability to manipulate earnings or 
real business activities. For instance, Zhang (2008) finds firms just meeting their cash flow 
forecasts engage in higher real activities manipulation to inflate cash flows and that such 
manipulation adversely affects firms’ operating performance in the subsequent year, whereas 
Call (2008) shows firms with cash flow forecasts report lower absolute levels of abnormal 
operating cash flows relative to firms without cash flow forecasts because of the monitoring role 
of cash flow forecasts. Similarly, McInnis and Collins (2011) find that accrual quality improves 
following the provision of analyst cash flow forecasts, presumably because of the increased 
saliency of forecasted accruals, coupled with the increased costs of accruals management that 
constrain managers’ ability to manage accruals. McInnis and Collins (2011) also find a 
significant shift from upward accrual management to downward earnings expectations 
management after analyst provision of cash flow forecasts. 
Despite the importance of analyst cash flow forecasts, McInnis and Collins (2011) find 
that firms do not shift their meeting or beating behavior from earnings to cash flow targets. In 
particular, they document that, while firms are most likely to meet or beat both targets (37.4 
percent), many firms meet or beat the earnings target, but miss the cash flow target (29 percent). 
Nonetheless, Melendrez et al. (2008) show the market reacts more strongly to the cash flow than 
the accrual surprise component of total earnings surprise, and that only firms beating both 
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earnings and cash flow targets are rewarded by the market.14 Consistent with Melendrez et al. 
(2008), Brown et al. (2013)  show firms that beat both earnings and cash flow targets experience 
larger positive capital market reactions, larger earnings response coefficients, and better future 
firm performance than firms that beat the earnings target but miss the cash flow target. In 
addition, Call (2008) shows investors assign more (less) weight to operating cash flows than 
accruals if firms do (do not) have with cash flow forecasts.  
Because prior literature suggests an increasing number of analysts’ cash flow forecasts 
and capital market incentives to meet or beat both analyst earnings and cash flow forecasts, my 
study adds to this stream of literature by examining further whether downward CXM and/or 
AXM are used to meet or beat analysts’ cash flow and/or earnings forecasts accounting for other 
available earnings management tools. Specifically, the importance of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts as another explicit target and the increase in management’s use of downward EXM for 
firms with both earnings and cash flow forecasts motivate me to conduct this study and examine 
whether managers perceive the importance of walking down analysts’ earnings forecasts via cash 
flows and accruals to meet or beat both analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 Total earnings surprise is defined as the sum of cash flow and accrual surprises. Cash flow (accrual) surprise is 
defined as actual reported CFO (accrual) minus the most recent cash flow (accrual) forecasts prior to earnings 
announcement date.  
19 
 
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
To decide whether to engage in earnings expectations management via operating cash 
flows or accruals, managers must assess the pros and cons of both strategies, taking into 
consideration other available tools such as upward cash flow and accrual management.15,16 
Because expectations management strategies involve both managers and analysts, managers 
must also anticipate analysts’ reaction to management cash flow and/or accrual guidance (i.e., 
whether analysts will make a downward revision or not). I argue that managers (analysts) make 
decisions to manage analysts’ expectations downwards (revise forecasts downwards) based on 
firm-specific characteristics. More specifically, I identify and test whether the following firm-
specific characteristics are associated with firms’ propensity to engage in downward CXM 
and/or downward AXM.17  
I identify three firm characteristics specific to reported operating cash flows (accruals) 
which should motivate firm managers to engage in downward CXM (AXM). First, I predict 
firms with lower cash flow (accrual) growth from the immediately prior year are more likely to 
manage analysts’ cash flow (accrual) expectations downwards.18 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
show managers use earnings management to avoid earnings decreases, suggesting managers have 
incentives to maintain increasing earnings pattern. Therefore, lower cash flow (accrual) growth 
suggests firms have limited abilities to manipulate cash flows (accruals) upwards to meet or beat 
                                                             
15 Figure 2 summarizes the two cash flow (upward CFO management, downward CXM) and two accrual (upward 
accrual management, downward AXM) management strategies.  
16 I refrain from discussing the use of real earnings management as another tool because REM is highly correlated 
with upward CFO management strategies and I focus on cash flow versus accrual management strategies.  
17 Appendix C summarizes all hypotheses and results. 
18 Cash flow (accrual) growth is defined as a change in reported operating cash flows (accrual) divided by prior year 
operating cash flows (accruals).  
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cash flow (accrual) forecasts, increasing firm managers’ motivation to walk down analyst cash 
flow (accrual) forecasts. Analysts are also more likely to revise their forecasts of lower cash flow 
(accrual) growth firms downwards than upwards to avoid upsetting investors for being too 
optimistic while currying favor with management by enabling them to report cash flows 
(accruals) that meet or beat cash flow (accrual) forecasts.  
H1a: Firms with lower cash flow (accrual) growth are relatively more likely to manage 
analyst cash flow (accrual) expectations downwards 
 
Second, Das et al. (2011) find managers are likely to use downward EXM as a 
substitutive tool when firms have constraints on using upward earnings management tools. 
Matsumoto (2002) suggests firms may experience negative market reactions if they walk down 
earnings forecasts too early in the period. Taken together, prior literature suggests firm managers 
are incentivized to initially use upward earnings management and switch to downward earnings 
guidance later in the period. Based on this evidence, I argue that firms that miss cash flow 
(accrual) forecasts in the prior period are likely to have difficulty in manipulating their reported 
cash flows (accruals) upwards to avoid negative cash flow (accrual) surprises. However, given 
the existence of cash flow (accrual) targets, firms’ managers have strong incentives to walk 
down cash flow (accrual) forecasts to a beatable level in the current period. Analysts are also 
relatively more likely to follow management guidance because downward cash flow (accrual) 
forecast revisions are more consistent with their past modus operandi than upward revisions.  
H1b: Firms that miss prior-period cash flow (accrual) forecasts are relatively more 
likely to manage analyst cash flow (accrual) expectations downwards 
 
Third, I propose firms with lower cash flow (accrual) forecast uncertainty are more likely 
to manage analyst cash flow (accrual) expectations downwards to meet or beat cash flow 
(accrual) forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) finds earnings forecast uncertainty to be negatively 
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associated with the probability of meeting or beating earnings forecasts. I extend this theory to 
cash flow (accrual) forecasts, and predict that a low cash flow (accrual) forecast uncertainty 
environment (i.e., small absolute cash flow or accrual forecast error) provides a more precise 
range for firm managers and analysts to revise cash flow (accrual) forecasts downwards to a 
beatable level.  
H1c: Firms with less cash flow (accrual) forecast uncertainty are relatively more likely 
to manage analyst cash flow (accrual) expectations downwards 
 
Firms facing constraints to manipulate reported CFO (accruals) upwards may consider 
engaging in upward accrual (CFO) management, downward CXM, or downward AXM. Lee 
(2012) finds evidence that firms manipulate reported CFO upward to meet or beat analyst cash 
flow forecasts, suggesting firms with constraints on upward CFO management are more likely to 
turn to downward CXM to increase the probability of meeting or beating cash flow and earnings 
forecasts. Focusing on the trade-off between real and accrual earnings management, Zang (2012) 
identifies a set of costs for real activities manipulation and accrual management to meet or beat 
earnings targets. Because the literature is unclear regarding the trade-off between upward CFO 
(accrual) management and earnings expectations management, I examine whether firm-specific 
factors identified by Zang (2012) lead to downward CXM, downward AXM, or both. Thus, my 
rationale for examining these firm-specific factors is related to but differs from Zang’s study. 
 Similar to Zang, I investigate four firm-specific characteristics: (1) financial health, (2) 
market-leader status in the industry, (3) institutional ownership, and (4) accounting flexibility, 
but unlike Zang, I examine if these factors incentivize managers to engage in downward CXM 
and/or AXM.19 Poor financial health firms have liquidity and solvency issues. Because of high 
                                                             
19 I do not include tax incentives from Zang (2012) in my hypotheses because the marginal tax rate and the level of 
book-tax conformity discussion is more relevant to the trade-off between real and accrual earnings management. I 
also exclude the scrutiny of auditors because auditors generally do not audit management guidance. 
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bankruptcy risks, poor financial health firms have less flexibility to adjust timing for non-cash 
working capital to increase reported CFO and earnings and may turn to downward CXM and/or 
AXM to improve cash flow and earnings performance. Using a sample of firms with both 
earnings and cash flow forecasts, McInnis and Collins (2011) show firms in better financial 
health are more likely to meet or beat earnings forecasts. This suggests firms in better financial 
health generally have stronger incentives to meet or beat analysts’ cash flow and accrual 
forecasts because the consequence of missing these targets are relatively more severe. Analysts 
are also relatively more likely to go along with these firms to curry favor with management and 
to obtain investment banking opportunities. Therefore, firms in better financial health may be 
more likely to walk down cash flow and/or accrual forecasts. 
Firms closely monitored by institutional investors are less likely to manipulate reported 
CFO upwards (Zang 2012). For instance, if they temporarily increase non-cash working capital 
in the fourth quarter of the current year, institutional investors can detect the reversal nature of 
this strategy in the first quarter of the following year. Thus, these firms may turn to downward 
CXM and/or AXM to improve reported CFO and earnings. Alternatively, it can be argued that 
firms with lower levels of institutional ownership have more flexibility to engage in any type of 
expectations management, thus leading to downward CXM and/or AXM.  
Because they generate a large volume of sales relative to other firms in the industry, 
market leaders are more capable of engaging in transaction timing to inflate reported CFO than 
market-follower firms (Zang 2012).20 For instance, their large proportion of sales enhances their 
ability to obtain cash discounts from suppliers, delay cash paid to suppliers, or accelerate cash 
                                                             
20 I refer to transaction timing more often than classification shifting as a way to manipulate reported CFO upwards 
due to the more frequent use of the former strategy in practice.  
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collections from customers than market followers. Also, their greater bargaining power makes 
them relatively more likely to be effective in walking down cash flow and/or accrual forecasts to 
a beatable level. In contrast, market followers incur higher costs to manage CFO upwards so they 
may be motivated to turn to downward CXM and/or AXM as a less costly tool to lower analysts’ 
cash flow and/or accrual estimates and avoid negative cash flow and accrual surprises.  
Barton and Simko (2002) show firms with bloated balance sheets (i.e., firms with 
cumulative income-increasing accruals in prior periods) have less flexibility to engage in accrual 
management, making it more likely they will turn to downward CXM and/or AXM. On the other 
hand, managers of firms with less bloated balance sheets may have less aggressive accounting 
estimates, resulting in higher earnings quality. Thus, firms with higher accounting flexibility 
(i.e., firms with less bloated balance sheets) may be more effective in convincing analysts to 
revise their cash flow and/or accrual forecasts downwards.  
 In addition to the four firm specific factors identified by Zang (2012), another potential 
factor that may incentivize firm managers to engage in downward CXM and/or AXM is the 
enactment of SOX (i.e., pre- versus post-SOX period).21 Cohen et al. (2008) document a 
significant decline (increase) in upward accrual management (upward CFO management) in the 
post-SOX period. However, it is unclear whether the pre or post-SOX period experienced more 
downward CXM and/or AXM (i.e., firms have constraints on managing reported accruals 
upwards so they may switch to downward CXM and/or AXM in the post-SOX period). 
Nevertheless, since Bartov et al. (2009) find a significant decline in both downward EXM and 
upward accruals management in the post-SOX period, suggesting firm managers perceive higher 
                                                             
21 I do not examine pre- versus post-Regulation FD (Reg FD) period because Reg FD impacts the forms of earnings 
expectations management (i.e., Reg FD prohibits private earnings guidance) rather than the components of earnings 
expectations management (i.e., CXM versus AXM). In contrast, SOX was enacted mainly to address accrual related 
scandals.  
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costs of engaging in any type of expectations management strategies post-SOX so they reduce 
the use of downward CXM and/or AXM. On the one hand, analysts are willing to revise their 
forecasts downwards in the post-SOX period to provide a more conservative benchmark. On the 
other hand, analysts may ignore management guidance if they perceive higher detection costs in 
this period.  
Because the net effect of the above argument could go either way, other things being 
equal, I set hypotheses H2a-e in null form as follows.  
H2a: Firms’ financial health is not associated with downward cash flow and/or accrual 
expectations management 
 
H2b: Institutional ownership is not associated with downward cash flow and/or accrual 
expectations management 
 
H2c: Market leader status in the industry is not associated with downward cash flow 
and/or accrual expectations management 
 
H2d: Accounting flexibility is not associated with downward cash flow and/or accrual 
expectations management 
 
H2e: Post-SOX period is not associated with downward cash flow and/or accrual 
expectations management 
 
For practical implications, it is important to understand which firm-specific 
characteristics motivate managers to walk down cash flow forecasts, accrual forecasts, or both. 
Thus, after identifying factors that incentivize managers to walk down analysts’ earnings 
forecasts via cash flows and/or accruals, I examine whether the factors represent a trade-off 
between downward CXM and downward AXM. Because my sample consists of firms with both 
earnings and cash flow forecasts, walking down the cash flow component of earnings (downward 
CXM) alone may be sufficient to meet or beat cash flow and earnings forecasts simultaneously. 
Thus, it can be argued that firms with the aforementioned characteristics are more likely to 
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engage in downward CXM rather than downward AXM. On the other hand, because downward 
AXM helps firms to meet or beat accrual forecasts which leads to an increase in the probability 
of meeting or beating earnings forecasts, firms with certain characteristics may be incentivized to 
engage in downward CXM and downward AXM similarly to meet or beat both forecasts.  
Therefore, I set my hypothesis H3 in null form as follows.  
H3: Firm managers do not trade-off between downward CXM and downward AXM 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
 I/B/E/S began collecting analysts’ cash flow forecasts in 1993 (DeFond and Hung 2003) 
so I use annual earnings and cash flow forecasts from I/B/E/S for the years, 1995 to 2010 to test 
my hypotheses.22 Some of my variables require data in periods t-2, t-1 and t+1 so I test my 
hypotheses using the period 1995 to 2010. In addition to I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts and actuals, I 
obtain main test variables and control variables from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and EVENTUS. 
 
4.2 Measures of downward cash flow and accrual expectations management23 
 Because managerial guidance of analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts cannot be 
directly observed, the earnings management literature proposes several proxies to measure 
earnings expectations management. Following prior literature (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Brown 
and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 2011), I measure the magnitude of earnings (cash flow) expectations 
management as the first consensus analyst forecast minus the last consensus analyst forecast of 
earnings (cash flows) per share, scaled by average total assets and multiplied by 100 to express 
earnings (cash flow) expectations management as a percentage. Because analysts do not 
explicitly provide forecasts of accruals, I estimate accrual expectations management as the 
difference between earnings and cash flow expectations management, and downward accruals 
guidance as a positive value of this difference. EXM, CXM, and AXM are continuous variables of 
earnings, cash flow and accrual expectations management, respectively. Following Brown and 
                                                             
22 I use annual data because most cash flow forecasts are provided on an annual basis (McInnis and Collins 2011). I 
do not include 1993 and 1994 because the data are scarce in the first two years. 
23 All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Pinello (2007), firm-year observations must satisfy the following criteria to be included in the 
sample: (1) at least two individual forecasts are made at least 20 trading days apart, (2) the 
earliest forecast must be issued at least one trading day after the prior year’s earnings release, 
and (3) the latest forecast must be issued at least three trading days before the current year’s 
earnings release.  
 
4.3 Measures of determinants of downward cash flow and/or accrual expectations 
management 
  I use the following three proxies to test cash flow (accrual) specific factors (H1a-c). First, 
cash flow growth (CFOGRt) [accrual growth (ACCGRt)] is measured as the ratio of change in 
reported operating cash flows (accruals) to prior year’s operating cash flows (accruals). Prior-
period meeting or beating cash flow forecast (PMBCt) [prior-period meeting or beating accrual 
forecasts (PMBAt)] is an indicator variable equal to one if firms MBC (MBA) in the prior year 
and zero otherwise (H1b). Cash flow forecast uncertainty (ABCFEt) [accrual forecast uncertainty 
(ABAFEt)] is measured as absolute value of the initial cash flow (accrual) forecast error, deflated 
by prior year price (H1c). I use the four proxies suggested by Zang (2012) to test H2a-d. First, I 
use Altman’s z-score at the beginning of the year (ZSCOREt-1) to proxy for firm’s financial 
health (H2a). Second, I use percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of the year 
(INSTt-1) to proxy for level of institutional investors (H2b). Third, I use market share at the 
beginning of the year (MKSHAREt-1), which is defined as the ratio of a company’s sales to total 
sales of its industry to proxy for market leader (H2c). Fourth, following Barton and Simko 
(2002), I use net operating assets at the beginning of the year (BLOATt-1) to proxy for firms’ 
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limited flexibility to engage in accrual manipulations (H2d). Post-SOX period (POSTSOXt) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if fiscal year is greater than 2002 and zero otherwise (H2e).  
 
4.4 Measures of upward cash flow and accrual management 
 Following Dechow et al. (1998), and adopted by Roychowdhury (2006), Call (2008), 
Zhang (2008), and Lee (2012), I define normal operating cash flows as a function of sales and 
change in sales in the current period, and ABCFO is reported CFO minus normal CFO estimated 
from the model. I use “abnormal operating cash flows” or ABCFO to measure the level of 
abnormal CFO. Using the COMPUSTAT database, I estimate this model for each industry-year 
group between 1995 and 2010 that contains a minimum of 15 observations.  
 I use the forward-looking model in Dechow et al. (2003) to estimate abnormal accruals or 
ABACC as my primary measure of AEM.24 ABACC is the difference between the reported 
accruals and the normal accruals estimated from the model. Using the COMPUSTAT database, I 
estimate this model for each industry-year between 1995 and 2010 that contains a minimum of 
15 observations. 
          
4.5 Empirical models for testing H1-H3       
 Test of Determinants of Downward CXM and/or AXM (Test of H1a-c, H2a-e) 
  To test firm-specific characteristics that motivate firm managers to walk down analyst 
cash flow and/or accrual forecasts, I estimate the following two OLS regression models. 
 
                                                             
24 I choose this model because Dechow et al. (2003) show the explanatory power of the forward-looking model is 
significantly higher than the well-known modified Jones model (i.e., the mean adjusted R2 increases from 9.2% for 
the modified Jones model to 20% for the forward-looking model). 
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CXMt = α0 + α1CFOGROt + α2PMBCt + α3ABCFEOt + α4ZSCOREt-1 + α5INSTt-1  
           +α6MKSHAREt-1 + α7BLOATt + α8POSTSOXt + α9FOLLOWt + α10EARNt 
           + α11SIZEt + α12MBt + α13LITt + α14RDt-1 + α15ABCFOOt + α16ABACCOt 
                 + α17AXMt + α18ACCGROt + α19ABAFEOt + εt                  Eq.(1)    
 
 
AXMt = β0 + β1ACCGROt + β2PMBAt + β3ABAFEOt + β4ZSCOREt-1 + β5INSTt-1  
          + β6MKSHAREt-1+ β7BLOATt + β8POSTSOXt + β9FOLLOWt + β10EARNt 
          + β11SIZEt + β12MBt + β13LITt + β14RDt-1 + β15ABCFOOt + β16ABACCOt 
               + β17CXMt + β18CFOGROt + β19ABCFEOt + εt                   Eq.(2) 
                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                      
All main variables of interest are defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. To mitigate correlated 
omitted variables, I include all cash flow and accrual variables in both equations. However, 
because of high correlations between cash flow and accrual variables (Spearman [Pearson] 
correlation between CFOGR and ACCGR = 0.31 [0.03]; Spearman [Pearson] correlation between 
ABCFE and ABAFE = 0.73 [0.84]; Spearman [Pearson] correlation between ABCFO and ABACC 
= -0.26 [-0.21]), I use a modified Gram–Schmidt procedure (Golub and Van Loan 1996) to 
orthogonalize these variables before including them in Eq.(1) and Eq.(2). The superscript “O” 
denotes orthogonalized variables.25,26 Negative and significant coefficients on CFOGRO, 
ABCFEO and PMBC [ACCGRO, ABAFEO and PMBA] suggest that each of these firm 
characteristics is associated with downward cash flow [accrual] expectations management (H1a-
c). Because I set H2a-e in null form, significant positive or negative coefficients on ZSCORE, 
                                                             
25After the orthogonalization process, correlations between cash flow and accrual independent variables drop 
significantly. Spearman [Pearson] correlation between CFOGRO and ACCGRO = 0.27 [-0.00]; Spearman [Pearson] 
correlation between ABCFEO and ABAFEO = -0.16 [0.00]; Spearman [Pearson] correlation between ABCFOO and 
ABACCO = -0.04 [-0.00]). 
26 The values of VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) for each variable before (after) orthogonalization are as follows: 
CFOGR = 1.06 (1.06), ACGR = 1.07 (1.06), ABCFE = 3.43 (1.16), ABAFE = 3.44 (1.03), ABCFO = 1.99 (1.67), 
ABACC = 1.93 (1.84). Mean VIF values for the whole model before and after orthogonalization are 1.73 and 1.45, 
respectively. Although multicollinearity is not severe due to low VIF values, orthogonalizing these variables is a 
more conservative approach, and results using unorthogonalized or orthogonalized variables are qualitatively 
similar. 
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INST, MKSHARE, BLOAT, and POSTSOX suggest each of these firm characteristics motivate 
firm managers to walk down cash flow and/or accrual forecasts.  
 Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Lee (2012), I include EARN, SIZE and MB as 
control variables. EARN is included to control for the level of earnings. SIZE and MB control for 
differences in firm size and growth opportunities, respectively. ABCFOO, ABACCO and AXM 
(CXM) control for the potential effect of other available tools on CXM (AXM). Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), FOLLOW controls for the relative number of analysts providing cash 
flow forecasts to number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for each firm-year. LIT 
controls for the potential lawsuit effect on firms’ incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises 
(Matsumoto 2002). RD controls for the effect of proprietary information costs on firms’ 
propensity to issue bad news information (Verrecchia 1983, Kross et al. 2011). I also include all 
accrual (cash flow) specific determinants to mitigate correlated omitted variables in Eq.1 (Eq.2). 
Test of Determinants of Downward CXM over AXM (Test of H3) 
  To determine firm-specific characteristics that motivate firm managers to walk down 
analyst cash flow rather than accrual forecasts, I estimate the following logistic regression 
model. 
Prob (CXM_OA = 1)t = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1CFOGROt + 𝛿2PMBCt + 𝛿3ABCFEOt + 𝛿4ZSCOREt-1  
               + 𝛿5INSTt-1 + 𝛿6MKSHAREt-1 + 𝛿7BLOATt + 𝛿8POSTSOXt + 𝛿9ACCGROt 
                + 𝛿10ABAFEOt + 𝛿11FOLLOWt + 𝛿12EARNt + 𝛿13SIZEt + 𝛿14MBt + 𝛿15LITt 
              + 𝛿16RDt-1+ 𝛿17ABCFOOt + 𝛿18ABACCOt + εt                Eq.(3)27                                                                                                                                                   
 
I use the probability of firms engaging in downward CXM over downward AXM as the 
main dependent variable. Significant negative (positive) coefficients on CFOGRO, ABCFEO and 
PMBC (ACCGRO and ABAFEO) suggest that each of these cash flow or accrual specific 
                                                             
27 I do not include PMBA variable in this equation because PMBC and PMBA are highly correlated 
(Pearson/Spearman correlation = -0.85) and I cannot orthogonalize indicator variables.  
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characteristics increases the likelihood of firms engaging in downward CXM over downward 
AXM. Significant positive or negative coefficients on ZSCORE, INST, MKSHARE, BLOAT, and 
POSTSOX suggest each of these firm characteristics motivate firm managers to walk down cash 
flow forecasts rather than accrual forecasts.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses  
Panel A of Table 1 presents sample selection of earnings and cash flow data that satisfy 
all three criteria of Brown and Pinello (2007) for calculating EXM and CXM. Firm-year 
observations with complete first and last I/B/E/S consensus earnings and cash flow forecasts 
between 1995 and 2010 are 48,203 and 9,497 respectively. Panel B of Table 1 presents sample 
selection for main data analyses. Final firm-year observations for hypotheses testing after 
removing missing COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S variables are 4,353.28 Based on the final sample 
(n=4,353), 56.37% (66.67%) [39.38%] of my sample meet or beat cash flow (earnings) [both 
cash flow and earnings] forecasts (untabulated results). This evidence is consistent with McInnis 
and Collins (2011) who document that 53.4% (66.4%) [37.4%] of their sample meet or beat cash 
flow (earnings) [both cash flow and earnings] forecasts. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the final sample. The means of CXM (0.009), 
AXM (0.001) are positive suggesting the existence of downward expectations management in 
general (despite small positive values). In addition, 50.9% of the sample firm-years are more 
likely to engage in downward CXM than in downward AXM. Means of all orthogonalized 
variables are 0.000 with standard deviations of 1.000.29 
                                                             
28 My sample drops about 2,112 firm-year observations after including prior-period variables.  
29 Although the mean of zero and standard deviation of one for orthogonalized variables are similar to the properties 
of standardized variables, they are two different processes and yield slightly different values [e.g., mean (std.) of 
orthogonalized ABCFO = -1.89E-17 (1.000115); mean (std.) of standardized ABCFO = -3.87E-10 (1)]. 
Conceptually, the modified Gram-Schmidt algorithm (i.e., Orthog function in Stata) produces orthonormal vectors 
with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one (Golub and Van Loan 1996). These vectors are perpendicular and 
the correlation effect is largely removed (Rodgers et al. 1984). In contrast, the standardization process rescales 
values without removing the correlation effect between two variables, providing the same correlation for 
unstandardized and standardized variables.  
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Table 3 presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations of all variables. Based on Pearson 
correlations, CXM is negatively correlated with CFOGRO (-0.09) and PMBC (-.05) at the 0.05 
level, supporting H1a and H1b. That is, firms with lower cash flow growth and those missing 
prior-period cash flow targets are likely to engage in downward CXM. Contrary to the null 
hypothesis H1c, CXM is positively correlated with ABCFEO (0.03). As for accrual specific 
factors, I find results opposite to my predictions. PMBA is not correlated with AXM. AXM is 
positively correlated with ACCGRO (0.04) and ABAFEO (0.04). To sum up, univariate results 
suggest cash flow (accrual) specific factors do (do not) lead to downward cash flow (accrual) 
expectations management.  
In addition, I find that CXM is positively (negatively) correlated with ZSCORE (INST, 
MKSHARE), suggesting that firms with firm with better financial health, firms with lower 
institutional ownership and firms with lower market shares are more likely to walk down cash 
flow forecasts. POSTSOX is negatively correlated with both CXM and AXM, suggesting firms in 
the pre-SOX period are relatively more likely to walk down both cash flow and accrual forecasts. 
BLOAT is not correlated with either CXM or AXM. 
 
5.2 Multivariate analyses  
            5.2.1 Results of H1a-c and H2a-e (Determinants of downward CXM and/or AXM) 
 Table 4 presents OLS regression results of Eq.(1) which examines the determinants of 
downward CXM. Coefficients on CFOGRO and PMBC are negative and statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level (H1a and H1b are supported). In other words, due to firms’ limited abilities to 
manipulate reported CFO upwards, firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-
period cash flow targets are likely to walk down cash flow forecasts in order to meet or beat cash 
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flow targets in the current period. Because ABCFEO is not associated with CXM, H1c is not 
supported, suggesting cash flow forecast uncertainty does not explain cross-sectional differences 
in downward CXM.  
Table 5 presents OLS regression results of Eq.(2) which examines the determinants of 
downward AXM. Unlike Table 4 results, ACCGRO and ABAFEO are not associated with AXM. 
PMBA is positively associated with AXM but the relation is marginally significant at the 0.10 
level. Therefore, H1a, H1b, H1c are not supported. Taken together, my results suggest accrual 
specific factors do not play an important role in explaining cross-sectional differences in 
downward AXM. Nevertheless, I find that POSTSOX is negatively associated with AXM (H2e 
null hypothesis is rejected). While prior literature suggests the existence of downward EXM in 
the pre-SOX period, my results provide further evidence that managers use (do not use) 
downward AXM (downward CXM) in the pre-SOX period. Because accrual related information 
is less scrutinized by external parties in the pre-SOX period, managers may perceive lower costs 
of walking down analysts’ accrual forecasts and rely on this strategy to meet or beat earnings 
forecasts via accruals.  
Based on the results of Tables 4 and 5, several firm specific characteristics are found to 
be associated with both downward CXM and downward AXM, which are equivalent to firms 
engaging in downward EXM. Specifically, I find firms in better financial condition and firms 
with market leader status are likely to engage in both downward CXM and downward AXM, 
perhaps because the consequences of missing either cash flow or accrual targets are higher for 
these firms, and these firms have sufficient resources to engage in both strategies in the same 
period. In addition, firms with lower institutional ownership (INST) and firms with less bloated 
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balance sheets (BLOAT) engage in both downward CXM and downward AXM, consistent with 
their being less scrutinized by the investors and regulators.30 
          5.2.2 Results of H3 (Trade-off between downward CXM and downward AXM) 
Table 6 present logistic regression results of Eq.(3) for testing H3. I find that the 
likelihood of firms engaging in downward CXM versus downward AXM differs for firms with 
lower cash flow growth and firms that miss cash flow forecasts in the prior period. To be 
specific, a one unit decrease in cash flow growth increases the probability of firms engaging in 
downward CXM rather than downward AXM by 3%. The probability of firms engaging in 
downward CXM over downward AXM increases by 6% for firms that miss prior-period cash 
flow targets. These results are consistent with the Table 4 results which examine determinants of 
downward CXM. In contrast, while I find firms with better financial condition, lower 
institutional ownership, and less bloated balance sheets engage in both downward CXM and 
AXM, the trade-off results suggest firms with these characteristics are more likely to walk down 
cash flow than accrual forecasts. Furthermore, contrary to my prediction, firms with lower 
accrual forecast uncertainty are marginally likely to walk down cash flow rather than accrual 
forecasts. As discussed in Chapter 4, I require that my sample consists of firms with both 
analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts to calculate downward CXM and AXM. Given that 
these firms have two explicit targets to achieve, the less costly and more effective strategy is to 
walk down analysts’ earnings forecasts via cash flows, which will increase the probability of 
meeting or beating both earnings and cash flow forecasts. In other words, guiding analysts’ 
accrual forecasts downwards may help firms meet or beat earnings forecasts via accruals, but 
will not necessarily increase the likelihood of exceeding analysts’ cash flow expectations. This 
may explain why I find firms with several characteristics are more likely to walk down cash flow 
                                                             
30 Appendix C summarizes all hypotheses and results. 
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forecasts than accrual forecasts in this setting. Nonetheless, because of an increasing number of 
firms with both earnings and cash flow forecasts, my findings should be relevant to other studies 
that examine a similar setting. Taken together, my results suggest that firm-specific 
characteristics play an important role in explaining management’s use of downward CXM and/or 
AXM in order to meet or beat cash flow and earnings forecasts.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
6.1 Logistic regression analyses for H1 and H2 
Section 5.2 discusses multivariate analyses of H1 and H2 using OLS regression models.  
As a robustness test, I estimate logistic regression models to test H1 and H2 as follows.31 
Prob(DCXMt) = θ0 + θ1CFOGROt + θ2PMBCt + θ3ABCFEOt + θ4ZSCOREt-1 + θ5INSTt-1   
                         + θ6MKSHAREt-1+ θ7BLOATt + θ8POSTSOXt + θ9FOLLOWt + θ10EARNt  
                         + θ11SIZEt + θ12MBt + θ13LITt + θ14RDt-1 + θ15ABCFOOt + θ16ABACCOt  
                                      + θ17AXMt + θ18ACCGROt + θ19ABAFEOt + εt                                    Eq.(4) 
 
Prob(DAXMt) = ν0 + ν1ACCGROt + ν2PMBAt + ν3ABAFEOt + ν4ZSCOREt-1 + ν5INSTt-1  
                        + ν6MKSHAREt-1+ ν7BLOATt + ν8POSTSOXt + ν9FOLLOWt + ν10EARNt  
                          + ν11SIZEt + ν12MBt + ν13LITt+ ν14RDt-1 + ν15ABCFOOt + ν16ABACCOt  
                                       + ν17CXMt + ν18CFOGROt + ν19ABCFEOt + εt                                    Eq.(5) 
 
Table 7 presents logistic regression results of Eq.(4). I find all three cash flow specific 
factors are negatively associated with downward CXM (H1a, H1b and Hc are supported). That 
is, firms with lower cash flow growth (CFOGRO), firms that miss prior period cash flow 
forecasts (PMBC), and firms with lower cash flow forecast uncertainty (ABCFEO) are more 
likely to engage in downward CXM. While I do not find cash flow forecast uncertainty to be 
associated with downward CXM under the OLS regression model, my logistic regression results 
suggest a possibility that a lower cash flow forecast uncertainty (i.e., smaller absolute cash flow 
forecast error) provides a more precise range for managers to walk down analysts’ expectations 
to a beatable level. Consistent with Table 4 results (determinants of downward CXM), I find 
                                                             
31 I do not examine H3 using indicator variables of downward CXM and downward AXM (DCXM and DAXM 
variables) because my dependent variable in H3 (the trade-off model) compares the difference between continuous 
variables of CXM and AXM.  
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firms with better financial health, lower institutional ownership, and less bloated balance sheets 
are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow forecasts.  
Table 8 presents logistic regression results of Eq.(5). Similar to Table 5 results 
(determinants of downward AXM), accrual specific factors (ACCGRO, PMBA, ABAFE) are not 
associated with downward AXM. As for other firm specific factors, I find firms with better 
financial health and firms with market leader status are more likely to engage in downward 
AXM, consistent with Table 5 results. In addition, firms in the pre-SOX period are more likely to 
walk down analysts’ forecasts via accruals.  
Overall, my robustness tests using logistic regression models confirm my main analyses 
using OLS regression models for both the determinants of downward CXM and downward 
AXM. For instance, firms experienced constraints on managing reported cash flow forecasts 
upwards (i.e., firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-period cash flow 
forecasts) are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow forecasts. In contrast, firms with less 
constraints on upward cash flow management (i.e., firms in a better financial condition and firms 
with market leader status) are more likely to walk down earnings forecasts via both cash flows 
and accruals because these firms have financial resources to engage in both strategies to avoid 
missing either cash flow or accrual targets. 
 
6.2 Alternative measure of downward cash flow and accrual expectations management  
After validating that my primary findings are robust to another model specification in 
Section 6.1, Section 6.2 examines whether using an alternative measure of downward CXM and 
downward AXM yield similar results. I estimate EXM (CXM) using Matstumoto’s (2002) 
earnings expectations management model. While this model captures both public and private 
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communication between managers and analysts, it requires many lags of observations to predict 
annual changes in earnings and forecast revisions, resulting in significant data loss (Athanasakou 
et al. 2011). This issue becomes more severe for the cash flow data required to estimate CXM 
which is why I use Matsumoto’s model as a secondary proxy of EXM and CXM.  
To be specific, I use the forecast guidance model by Matsumoto (2002) to estimate the 
expected level of analysts’ earnings (cash flow) forecasts by modeling the seasonal change in 
earnings (cash flows) as a function of the prior year’s seasonal change in earnings (cash flows) 
and returns cumulated over the current year. Using data from I/B/E/S and CRSP, I estimate this 
expected level of analysts’ earnings (cash flow) forecasts model for each firm-year between 1995 
and 2010 using all observations from the same two-digit SIC code and fiscal year (that contains a 
minimum 10 observations), except those from the firm for which I am estimating the parameters. 
I add this expected change in analysts’ earnings (cash flow) forecasts to the prior year reported 
EPS (CPS) to obtain the expected forecast of EPS (CPS) in the current period. The unexpected 
earnings (cash flow) forecast is calculated as the difference between the expected forecast and 
the actual analysts’ forecast. Unexpected accrual forecast is calculated as unexpected earnings 
forecast minus unexpected cash flow forecast. An indicator variable of downward CXM (AXM) 
occurs when the unexpected cash flow (accrual) forecast is positive. 
Because there are many missing observations from the estimates of expected level of 
analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts, I mitigate this problem by following an approach by 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) to replace missing unexpected earnings and cash flow forecasts with 
an indicator of negative earnings and cash flow forecast revisions based on Brown and Pinello 
(2007). Using this procedure, my sample consists of an indicator variable of downward CXM 
and AXM (i.e., CXMMAT and AXMMAT) that are derived from two different methods (i.e., 
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Matsumoto 2002 model and Brown and Pinello 2007 model). Using CXMMAT and AXMMAT as 
the dependent variables, I estimate the following two logistic regression models to test H1 and 
H2.32 
Prob(CXMMATt) = ω0 + ω1CFOGROt + ω2PMBCt + ω3ABCFEOt + ω4ZSCOREt-1 + ω5INSTt-1  
                              + ω6MKSHAREt-1 + ω7BLOATt + ω8POSTSOXt + ω9FOLLOWt + ω10EARNt        
                              + ω11SIZEt + ω12MBt + ω13LITt + ω14RDt-1 + ω15ABCFOOt + ω16ABACCOt  
                                             + ω17AXMt + ω18ACCGROt + ω19ABAFEOt + εt                                       Eq.(6) 
 
Prob(AXMMATt) = γ0 + γ1ACCGROt + γ2PMBAt + γ3ABAFEOt + γ4ZSCOREt-1 + γ5INSTt-1  
                               + γ6MKSHAREt-1+ γ7BLOATt + γ8POSTSOXt + γ9FOLLOWt + γ10EARNt  
                               + γ11SIZEt + γ12MBt + γ13LITt+ γ14RDt-1 + γ15ABCFOOt + γ16ABACCOt  
                                              + γ17CXMt + γ18CFOGROt + γ19ABCFEOt + εt                                         Eq.(7) 
 
Table 9 presents logistic regression results of Eq.(6). I find all three cash flow specific 
factors are negatively associated with downward CXM (H1a, H1b and Hc are supported). That 
is, firms with lower cash flow growth (CFOGRO), firms that miss prior period cash flow 
forecasts (PMBC), and firms with lower cash flow forecast uncertainty (ABCFEO) are more 
likely to engage in downward CXM. This is consistent with my logistic regression results in 
Table 7 in Section 6.1. In addition, I find firms with better financial health (ZSCORE) and firms 
with less bloated balance sheets (BLOAT) are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts, consistent with Table 4 results. Contrary to the main results, MKSHARE is negatively 
associated with CXM but the relation is only marginally significant at the 0.10 level.  
Table 10 presents logistic regression results of Eq.(7). Contrary to previous findings in 
Table 5 (determinants of downward AXM) and Table 8 (determinants of downward AXM using 
a logistic regression model), I find ACCGRO to be negatively associated with AXM, suggesting 
that firms with lower accrual growth are more likely to walk down accrual forecasts (H2c is 
                                                             
32 I do not examine H3 using indicator variables of downward CXM and AXM in Section 6.2 (CXMMAT and 
AXMMAT variables) because my dependent variable in H3 (the trade-off model) compares the difference between 
continuous variables of CXM and AXM. 
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supported). However, I do not find PMBA or ABAFEO to be associated with AXM, consistent 
with previous findings. INST and BLOAT are found to be positively associated with AXM, 
contrary to results in Table 5. Finally, I find POSTSOX to be negatively associated with AXM, 
consistent with the main analyses.  
To sum up, despite slightly weaker results of my robustness tests using an alternative 
measure of downward CXM and downward AXM, overall results are qualitatively similar to my 
main analyses using OLS regression models for both the determinants of downward CXM and 
downward AXM. For instance, firms experienced constraints on managing reported cash flow 
forecasts upwards (i.e., firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-period cash 
flow forecasts) are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash flow forecasts. In contrast, firms in a 
better financial condition are more likely to walk down earnings forecasts via both cash flows 
and accruals because these firms are capable of engaging in both strategies to avoid missing 
either cash flow or accrual targets. Firms with less bloated balance sheets are likely to walk 
down earnings forecasts via both cash flows and accrual forecasts because these firms are less 
scrutinized by regulators. Firms in the pre-SOX period are more likely to walk down accrual 
forecasts because of lower detection cost in that period.  
 
6.3 Heckman two-stage analyses for H1 and H233 
Because I require that firms have both earnings and cash flow forecasts to be included in 
the sample for estimating CXM and AXM, my empirical analyses in Section 5 may be subject to 
sample selection bias. Specifically, analysts’ decision to issue cash flow forecasts in addition to 
earnings forecasts may be self selected depending on firm specific characteristics. I use 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to address this issue. In the first step, I use a probit model 
                                                             
33 All variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
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to estimate a selection model of cash flow forecast determinants from DeFond and Hung (2003) 
in order to obtain the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In the second step, I include IMR as another 
control variable and estimate the main tests using an OLS regression model. To validate that my 
Heckman two-stage analyses are estimated properly, I replicate the cash flow forecast 
determinant model of DeFond and Hung (2003) using the following equation.  
Prob(CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1  
                  + λ5ZSCOREt-1 + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt                                                  Eq.(8)                                                   
  
Table 11 presents logistic regression results of Eq.(8). Using firm-year observations 
between 1995 and 2010, my results are consistent with DeFond and Hung (2003). That is, 
analysts are more likely to issue cash flow forecasts for firms with larger accruals, less 
comparable financial statements, higher earnings volatility, higher capital intensity, and lower 
Atlman’s Z-scores.34  
 Eq.(9) and Eq.(10) estimate the probit model of cash flow forecast determinants and OLS 
regression model of H1 test respectively.  
 Step 1 of Heckman procedure: Probit regression  
Prob(CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1 + λ5ZSCOREt-1  
          + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt                                                                                               Eq.(9) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Step 2 of Heckman procedure: OLS regression  
 
CXMt = µ0 + µ1CFOGROt +µ2PMBCt + µ3ABCFEOt + µ4ZSCOREt-1 + µ5INSTt-1  
         + µ6MKSHAREt-1+ µ7BLOATt + µ8POSTSOXt + µ9FOLLOWt + µ10EARNt  
         + µ11SIZEt +µ12MBt + µ13LITt + µ14RDt-1 + µ15ABCFOOt + µ16ABACCOt  
              + µ17AXMt + µ18ACCGROt + µ19ABAFEOt + µ20IMRt + εt                               Eq.(10) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Table 12 reports the two-step Heckman results for H1. Consistent with my main results in 
Table 4 (determinants of downward CXM), the two cash flow specific factors (CFGOGRO and 
                                                             
34 While DeFond and Hung (2003) use hand-collected data of footnote items to calculate accounting heterogeneity 
choices variable, I use COMPACC or accounting comparability from De Franco et al. (2011) to derive the level of 
financial statement comparability for each firm-year observation.  
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PMBC) are negatively associated with CXM, and ZSCORE is positively associated with CXM. 
Contrary to Table 4 results, INST, MKSHARE, and BLOAT are not associated with CXM, and 
POSTSOX is negatively associated with CXM. Stated alternatively, firms experienced constraints 
on managing reported cash flow forecasts upwards (i.e., firms with lower cash flow growth and 
firms that miss prior-period cash flow forecasts) are more likely to walk down analysts’ cash 
flow forecasts. Nonetheless, firms with less constraints on upward cash flow management (i.e., 
firms in a better financial condition) are also more likely to walk down cash flow forecasts 
because the consequences of missing cash flow targets are more severe for these firms.  
Eq.(11) and Eq.(12) estimate the probit model of cash flow forecast determinants and 
OLS regression model of H2 test respectively.  
 Step 1 of Heckman procedure: Probit regression  
Prob (CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1 + λ5ZSCOREt-1  
          + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt                                                                                               Eq.(11) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Step 2 of Heckman procedure: OLS regression  
 
AXMt = φ0 + φ1ACCGROt + φ2PMBAt + φ3ABAFEOt + φ4ZSCOREt-1 + φ5INSTt-1  
+ φ6MKSHAREt-1+ φ7BLOATt + φ8POSTSOXt + φ9FOLLOWt + φ10EARNt  
+ φ11SIZEt + φ12MBt + φ13LITt+ φ14RDt-1 + φ15ABCFOOt + φ16ABACCOt  
+ φ17CXMt + φ18CFOGROt + φ19ABCFEOt + φ20IMRt + εt                         Eq.(12)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                               
Table 13 reports the two-step Heckman results for H2. Consistent with my main results in 
Table 5 (determinants of downward AXM), ZSCORE and PMBA are positively associated with 
AXM . Contrary to Table 5 results, INST, MKSHARE, BLOAT and POSTSOX are not associated 
with AXM.  I also find ACCGRO is negatively associated with AXM at the 0.10 level. Stated 
alternatively, firms in a better financial condition are likely to walk down both cash flow and 
accrual forecasts because they are capable of engaging in both strategies and have stronger 
incentives to avoid negative cash flow and accrual surprises. Firms that meet or beat accrual 
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forecasts in the prior period are likely to walk down accrual forecasts in the current period. This 
is perhaps because the use of upward accrual management in prior-period sets higher 
expectations for analysts in the current period, and thus these firms are incentivized to walk 
down analysts’ accrual forecasts to MBA. While the main analyses do not find accrual growth to 
explain downward AXM, Heckman two-stage analyses suggest firms with constraints on upward 
accrual management (i.e., firms with lower accrual growth) are more likely to walk down accrual 
forecasts.  
 To sum up, although I find weaker results after controlling for a potential omitted 
variable using an inverse Mills ratio obtained from the cash flow forecast determinant model by 
DeFond and Hung (2003), Heckman two-stage analyses support my key findings that firms with 
lower cash flow growth, firms that miss prior period cash flow targets are more likely to engage 
in downward CXM, and firms with better financial health are more likely to engage in both 
downward CXM and AXM. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Motivated by the importance of meeting or beating multiple benchmarks (e.g., MBC and 
MBE), Chapter 1 introduces a decomposition of earnings expectations management into cash 
flow and accrual expectations management as two separate mechanisms that firm managers use 
to meet or beat analysts’ cash flow or accrual forecasts. In addition, it defines and illustrates 
possible scenarios and methods that managers use to walk down analysts’ cash flow and/or 
accrual forecasts. I contend that firm managers have four main strategies to meet or beat cash 
flow and (implied) accrual forecasts: (1) upward CFO management, (2) upward accrual 
management, (3) downward CXM, and (4) downward AXM. While prior research assumes 
managers do not walk down separate earnings components differently, Chapter 1 demonstrates 
how managers use cash flow and/or accrual expectations management to meet or beat multiple 
targets, describes main hypotheses regarding the determinants of downward CXM and AXM, 
and summarize key findings along with potential contributions to the literature.  
Chapter 2 discusses motivations to decompose earnings expectations management into 
cash flow and accrual expectations management in more detail, and reviews the extant literatures 
that are relevant to my study. The earnings expectations management literature suggests 
economic incentives for managers to engage in public and/or private EXM to meet or beat 
earnings targets, and that annual earnings guidance become more prevalent in the recent periods 
as a response to a call for the end of quarterly earnings guidance. The earnings and cash flow 
management literature suggests economic incentives exist for mangers to manipulate both 
reported operating cash flows and earnings to meet or beat earnings and/or cash flow forecasts. 
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Finally, the analysts’ cash flow forecast literature suggests an increasing number of cash flow 
forecasts and capital market incentives to meet or beat both earnings and cash flow forecasts.  
I argue that managers (analysts) make decisions to walk down analysts’ expectations 
(revise forecasts downwards) depending on various firm-specific characteristics. Chapter 3 
describes factors specific to reported CFO and accruals as well as other firm characteristic that 
may incentivize managers to walk down earnings components differently, and explains the 
rationale I use to formulate the three hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses sample selection and 
measurement of the variables of interest and control variables. Based on the main hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3, I translate theses hypotheses into OLS and logistic regression models to 
test H1-H3 as discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses empirical results of H1-H3 which 
essentially suggest cash flow (accrual) specific factors (do not) explain cross-sectional 
differences in downward cash flow (accrual) expectations management. In addition to the main 
empirical models established in Chapter 4, Chapter 6 discusses several sensitivity analyses to 
examine whether the primary findings in Chapter 5 are robust to another model specification, an 
alternative measure of CXM and AXM, and the Heckman two-step procedure.  
In conclusion, I hypothesize and find several firm characteristics that incentivize 
managers to walk down cash flow and/or accrual forecasts while controlling for other available 
tools. Overall, my results suggest firms with lower cash flow growth and firms that miss prior-
period cash flow targets explain: (1) cross-sectional differences in firms’ propensity to engage in 
downward CXM, and (2) cross-sectional differences in firms’ propensity to walk down cash flow 
rather than accrual forecasts. Because I find evidence that firms relying on downward CXM are 
more likely to meet or beat both cash flow and earnings forecasts, my study has implications for 
researchers and practitioners who are interested in examining the association between earnings 
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expectations management and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ multiple forecasts to 
consider for the differential effects of cash flow and accrual expectations management. 
My study is subject to limitations that may be addressed in future research as follows. 
First, because managerial guidance of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts cannot be 
directly observed, my two proxies of downward CXM and EXM based on two models [Brown 
and Pinello (2007) and Matsumoto (2002)] cannot distinguish between public and private 
expectations management. Future research may consider hand-collected data of public and 
private guidance to address this issue. Second, because analysts do not explicitly provide accrual 
forecasts, I cannot measure downward AXM directly. Thus, my proxies of AXM as the 
difference between EXM and CXM are subject to a measurement error. Third, I use analysts’ 
forecast revisions (i.e., first minus last consensus forecast) as a primary measure of CXM and 
EXM. Nonetheless, analysts’ downward revisions do not necessarily suggest that analysts make 
revisions following management guidance. Finally, Christensen et al. (2011) show managers use 
earnings guidance to influence analysts’ forecast exclusions. I do not address street earnings 
exclusions in this study. Future research may examine whether managers use downward cash 
flow (accrual) guidance to influence analysts to exclude earnings components differently.  
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Figure 1: Downward earnings expectations management via operating cash flows and 
accruals  
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Figure 2: Cash flow versus accrual management strategies   
Summary of prior literature35: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
My study: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
35 Real earnings management is related to but different from cash flow management because the former strategy is 
used to inflate reported earnings but could either increase or decrease reported CFO whereas the latter strategy is 
used to inflate reported CFO directly.  
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
 
ABACC Abnormal accrual is the difference between the reported accrual in 
COMPUSTAT and the normal level of accrual as estimated by the 
forward-looking modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 2003) 
 
ABACCO Orthogonalized ABACC (continuous variable) 
 
ABCFO Abnormal operating cash flow is the difference between the actual 
operating cash flows reported in COMPUSTAT and the normal 
(expected) level of operating cash flows (as estimated using the 
Dechow et al. 1998 model) 
 
ABCFOO 
 
Orthogonalized ABCFO (continuous variable) 
ABAFE Absolute value of the initial accrual forecast error (actual accrual per 
share minus first accrual forecast), deflated by price at the end of the 
prior year 
 
ABAFEO 
 
Orthogonalized ABAFE (continuous variable) 
ABCFE Absolute value of the initial cash flow forecast error (actual reported 
cash flow per share minus first cash flow forecast), deflated by price at 
the end of the prior year 
 
ABCFEO 
 
Orthogonalized ABCFE (continuous variable) 
ABSFE Absolute value of the initial earnings forecast error (actual reported 
EPS minus first EPS forecast), deflated by price at the end of the prior 
year 
 
ACC 
 
Magnitude of accruals is defined as the absolute value of the difference 
between net income before extra-ordinary items and operating cash 
flows, scaled by total assets  
 
ACCGR 
 
Accrual growth is defined as the ratio of change in accruals (current 
year’s accruals minus lagged accruals) to prior year’s accruals 
 
ACCGRO 
 
Orthogonalized ACCGR (continuous variable) 
ATA 
 
Average total assets 
 
AXM  
 
Accrual expectations management is defined as the difference between 
EXM and CXM (continuous variable) 
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Variables Definitions 
 
AXMO Orthogonalized AXM (continuous variable) 
 
AXMMAT 
 
Alternative measure of AXM using Matsumoto (2002) method. 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if UAF (Unexpected Accruals) is 
positive, and zero otherwise. UAF is defined as expected accrual 
forecasts (which is estimated based on prior year reported accruals and 
cumulative returns during the year) minus actual forecasts. Similar to 
Athanasakou et al. (2009), I replace missing UAF observations with an 
indicator of negative forecast revisions.  
 
BLOAT Bloat is defined as net operating assets scaled by sales 
 
CAPINT 
 
Capital Intensity is defined as gross property, plant and equipment 
scaled by sales 
 
CPS 
 
Cash flow per share 
 
CFI Cash flow forecast indicator equal to one if the firm has both earnings 
and cash flow forecasts and zero if the firm has only earnings forecasts 
 
CFOGR 
 
Cash flow growth is defined as the ratio of change in operating cash 
flows (current year’s CFO minus lagged CFO) to prior year’s operating 
cash flows 
 
CFOGRO 
 
Orthogonalized CFOGR (continuous variable) 
 
COMPACC 
 
Accounting comparability. Similar to De Franco et al. (2011), I define 
accounting comparability as the closeness of financial statements 
between two firms given the same set of economic events. Specifically, 
accounting comparability is estimated for each firm i - firm j 
combination within the same two-digit SIC codes. COMPACCt 
variable at the firm-year level is calculated by averaging the firm i – 
firm j COMPACCijt for a given firm i in period t.  
  
CXM 
 
 
Cash flow expectations management is defined as the difference 
between the initial cash flow forecast and the latest cash flow forecast 
scaled by average total assets, and multiply by 100 (continuous 
variable) 
 
CXMO Orthogonalized CXM (continuous variable) 
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Variables Definitions 
 
CXMMAT 
 
Alternative measure of CXM using Matsumoto (2002) method. 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if UCF (Unexpected Cash Flow) is 
positive, and zero otherwise. UCF is defined as expected cash flow 
forecasts (which is estimated based on prior year reported cash flows 
and cumulative returns during the year) minus actual forecasts. Similar 
to Athanasakou et al. (2009), I replace missing UCF observations with 
an indicator of negative forecast revisions.  
 
CXM_OA CXM Over AXM  
 
An indicator variable equal to one if  CXM > AXM (i.e., the magnitude 
of cash flow expectations management is greater than that of accrual 
expectation management), and zero otherwise          
                 
DAXM 
 
Downward accrual expectations management  
 
An indicator variable equal to one if AXM is greater than zero, and 
zero otherwise 
 
DCXM 
 
Downward cash flow expectations management  
 
An indicator variable equal to one if CXM is greater than zero, and 
zero otherwise 
 
EARN 
 
Earnings is calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by 
total assets 
 
EPS 
 
Earnings per share 
 
EXM 
 
Earnings expectations management is defined as the difference 
between the initial earnings forecast and the latest earnings forecast 
scaled by average total assets, and multiply by 100 (continuous 
variable) 
 
FOLLOW The ratio of number of analysts providing cash flow forecasts to 
number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for each firm-year  
 
FOLLOWEPS Number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for each firm-year 
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Variables Definitions 
 
IMR Inverse mills ratios that are obtained from a Probit regression in the 
first step of Heckman procedure and are included as a control variable 
in the second step of Heckman procedure 
 
INDPRO Average annual growth in industrial production calculated over the 12 
months ending at year t 
 
INST 
 
Institutional ownership is calculated as the percentage of shares that are 
held by institutional investors 
 
LIT 
 
An indicator variable equal to one for firms that belong to high 
litigation risk industries as defined by Matsumoto (2002), and zero 
otherwise. High litigation risk industries include 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 (four-digit SIC codes). 
 
MBA An indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations with a 
nonnegative accrual surprise (actual accrual per share minus last 
consensus accrual forecast), and zero otherwise 
 
MBBOTH An indicator variable equal to one if firms meet or beat both analysts’ 
cash flow and earnings forecasts, and zero otherwise (MBC = 1 and 
MBE = 1) 
 
MBC An indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations with a 
nonnegative cash flow surprise (actual reported CPS minus last 
consensus cash flow forecast), and zero otherwise 
 
MBE An indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations with a 
nonnegative earnings surprise (actual reported EPS minus last 
consensus earnings forecast), and zero otherwise 
 
MB Market-to-book ratio is market cap divided by book value of equity 
 
PMBA 
 
Prior year MBA 
PMBC 
 
Prior year MBC 
 
POSTSOX 
 
Post-SOX period is an indicator variable equal to one if fiscal year is 
greater than 2002, and zero otherwise 
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Variables Definitions 
 
POSUE An indicator variable equal to one if firms have a positive seasonal 
change in earnings, and zero otherwise 
 
RD 
 
Research and development expense scaled by average total assets 
SIZE Logarithm of market cap for each firm in the current year 
 
SHARES Average number of shares outstanding 
 
VOL Earnings volatility is calculated as the absolute value of standard 
deviation of five years’ earnings divided by mean of earnings  
 
ZSCORE 
 
Altman’s Z Score = 1.2(Net working capital)/ Total assets  
+ 1.4(RE)/ Total assets + 3.3(EBIT)/ Total assets + 0.6(Market value of 
equity)/ Book value of liabilities + 1.0(Sale)/ Total assets 
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Appendix B1: EXM Decomposition Test 
Logistic regression analysis of MBC, MBA on cash flow and accrual-based tools 
 
Variable 
Eq. (a) 
DV = Prob (MBC = 1)t 
Eq. (b) 
DV = Prob (MBA = 1)t 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff. Z-stat Marginal 
effect 
Predicted 
sign 
Coeff. Z-stat Marginal 
effect 
INTERCEPT ? .493** 2.47  ? -.412 -1.17  
ABCFOO + .173* 1.91 .04     
CXMO + .181*** 5.37 .04     
ABACCO     + .269*** 4.66 .06 
AXMO     + .223*** 5.55 .05 
POSUE + -.028 -.53 -.01 + .127* 1.94 .03 
INDPRO + .174 1.53 .04 + -.172 -1.37 -.04 
SIZE + -.010 -.45 -.00 + .023 .89 .01 
ABSFE - -.332 -.45 -.08 - -.830*** -2.63 -.20 
BLOAT + .049*** 2.76 .01 - -.038 -1.60 -.01 
MB - -.007 -.95 -.00 - .007 .80 .00 
FOLLOWEPS + .001 .39 .00 + -.000 -.07 -.00 
ZSCORE + -.009 -1.04 -.00 + -.009 -1.56 -.00 
CAPINT + -.035 -1.35 -.01 + .020 .83 .00 
SHARES - .00 .04 .00 - -.000 -.68 -.00 
         
 2 Log Likelihood -4693.795 2 Log Likelihood -4941.758 
 Chi-Square 194.996 Chi-Square 281.523 
 P-value .000 P-value .000 
 Pseudo R2 .04 Pseudo R2 .05 
 Correctly classified 58.35% Correctly classified 59.51% 
     
 N 7,386 N 7,386 
 N (MBC = 1) 4,136 N (MBA = 1) 3,349 
 N (MBC = 0) 3,250 N (MBA = 0) 4,037 
     
Notes to Appendix B1: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equations (a) and (b).  
Prob (MBC = 1)t = ρ0 + ρ1ABCFOOt + ρ2CXMOt + ρ3POSUEt + ρ4INDPROt + ρ5SIZEt + ρ6ABSFEt + ρ7BLOATt-1 
                               + ρ8MBt + ρ9FOLLOWEPSt + ρ10ZSCOREt-1 + ρ11CAPINTt + ρ12SHARESt + εt            Eq.(a) 
                                                                                                                        
Prob (MBA = 1)t =  η0 + η1ABACCOt + η2AXMOt + η3POSUEt + η4INDPROt + η5SIZEt + η6ABSFEt + η7BLOATt-1 
                               + η8MBt + η9FOLLOWEPSt + η10ZSCOREt-1 + η11CAPINTt + η12SHARESt + εt            Eq.(b) 
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year in all models.  *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 
two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal 
effect represents the overall average change in probability of meeting or beating analysts’ cash flow or accrual forecasts when the 
continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to one value for the dummy X variables. 
 
60 
 
Appendix B2: Decomposition Test 
Logistic regression analysis of MBBOTH on cash flow and accrual-based tools 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
sign 
DV = MBBOTH  
Eq.(c) Eq.(d) 
  Coeff. Z-stat Marginal 
effect 
Coeff. Z-stat Marginal 
effect 
INTERCEPT ? -.513*** -2.72  -4.872** -2.26  
EXM ? .041* 1.71 .01    
ABCFOO ? .140** 2.24 .03 .149** 2.36 .03 
CXMO ?    .099*** 3.01 .02 
ABACCO ? -.094*** -3.76 -.02 -.105*** -3.92 -.02 
AXMO ?    -.104*** -2.68 -.02 
POSUE + .160** 2.17 .04 .141* 1.92 .03 
INDPRO + .177* 1.84 .04 .177* 1.79 .04 
SIZE + .014 .71 .00 .012 .63 .00 
ABSFE - -1.763 -1.52 -.41 -1.621 -1.38 -.37 
BLOAT - .000 .01 .00 .004 .11 .00 
MB + -.012 -1.50 -.00 -.012 -1.58 -.00 
FOLLOWEPS + .004 1.48 .00 .004 1.44 .00 
ZSCORE - .001 .09 .00 .000 .07 .00 
CAPINT + -.047* -1.72 -.01 -.051* -1.94 -.01 
SHARES + -.000 -.42 -.00 -.000 -.39 -.00 
2 Log Likelihood -4821.566 -4806.132 
Chi-Square 232.655 263.523 
P-value .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .04 .05 
Correctly classified 61.44% 62.05% 
N 7,386 7,386 
N (MBBOTH = 1) 2,885 2,885 
N (MBBOTH = 0) 4,501 4,501 
   
Notes to Appendix B2: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equations (c)-(d).  
 
Prob (MBBOTH = 1)t = σ0 +  σ1EXMt +  σ2ACFOOt +  σ3ABACCOt +  σ4POSUEt +  σ5INDPROt  
                               +  σ6SIZEt  +  σ7ABSFEt +  σ8BLOATt-1+  σ9MBt + σ10FOLLOWEPSt  
                                                + σ11ZSCOREt-1 +  σ12CAPINTt +  σ13SHARESt + εt                                Eq.(c)                                                          
                                                                                                                        
Prob (MBBOTH = 1)t = χ0 +  χ1ABCFOOt +  χ2CXMOt +  χ3ABACCOt +  χ4AXMOt +  χ5POSUEt  
                            +  χ6INDPROt +  χ7SIZEt +  χ8ABSFEt +  χ9BLOATt-1+  χ10MBt +  χ11FOLLOWEPSt  
                            +  χ12ZSCOREt-1 +  χ13CAPINTt +  χ14SHARESt + εt                                   Eq.(d)                                                
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year in all models.  *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 
5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall 
average change in probability of meeting or beating analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts when the continuous X variables 
increase by one unit or when moving from zero to one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Appendix C: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
Determinants of CXM/AXM 
 
Hypotheses Results 
Cash flow (accrual) specific determinants 
 
H1a: Cash flow (accrual) growth 
(directional hypothesis) 
 H1a: Lower cash flow growth   Downward CXM  
 H1a: Lower accrual growth   Downward AXM 
 H1a: supported for cash flow growth 
 H1a: not supported for accrual growth 
 
H1b: Prior-period MBC (MBA) 
(directional hypothesis) 
 H1b: Missing prior-period cash flow forecasts   
       Downward CXM  
 H1b: Missing prior-period accrual forecasts   
       Downward AXM  
 
 H1b: supported for prior-period MBC 
 
 H1b: not supported for prior-period 
MBA 
H1c: Cash flow (accrual) forecast 
uncertainty (directional hypothesis) 
 H1c: Lower cash flow forecast uncertainty  
       Downward CXM  
 H1c: Lower accrual forecast uncertainty  
       Downward AXM  
 
 H1c: not supported for cash flow 
forecast uncertainty 
 H1c: not supported for accrual forecast 
uncertainty 
 
Firm characteristic determinants  
 
H2a: Firm’s financial health  
(null hypothesis) 
 
 H2a: Firm’s financial health  
       Downward CXM and/or AXM 
 
 H2a: null is rejected. Better financial 
health leads to both downward CXM 
and AXM 
 
H2b: Institutional ownership 
(null hypothesis) 
 H2b: Institutional ownership levels 
       Downward CXM and/or AXM 
 
 H2b: null is rejected. Lower 
institutional ownership leads to both 
downward CXM and AXM 
 
H2c: Market leader status in the 
industry (null hypothesis) 
  H2c: Market leader status 
       Downward CXM and/or AXM 
 
  H2c: null is rejected. Higher market 
shares lead to both downward CXM 
and AXM  
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Appendix C: Summary of Hypotheses and Results (Continued) 
 
Determinants of CXM/AXM 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H2d: Accounting flexibility  
(null hypothesis) 
 
 H2d: Accounting flexibility (levels of bloated 
balance sheets) 
       Downward CXM and/or AXM 
 
 H2d: null is rejected. Lower bloated 
balance sheets (higher accounting 
flexibility) lead to both downward 
CXM and AXM 
 
H2e: Pre- versus post-SOX period  
(null hypothesis) 
 
 H2e: Pre- versus post-SOX period  
       Downward CXM and/or AXM 
 
 H2e: null is rejected. Pre-SOX period 
leads to downward AXM 
 
Trade-off between downward CXM and AXM 
 
H3: Trade-off between downward 
CXM and AXM  
(null hypothesis) 
 
 H3: All eight firm-specific characteristics   
       Downward CXM over downward AXM 
 
 H3: null is rejected. Cash flow growth, 
prior-period MBC, financial health, 
institutional ownership, accounting 
flexibility lead to firms’ propensity to 
walk down cash flow over accrual 
forecasts.  
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TABLE 1 Sample selection 
 
Panel A: Sample selection of earnings (EPS) and cash flow (CPS) 
forecast data 
 
EPS 
 
CPS 
   
Firm-year observations with first consensus earnings (cash flow) forecasts 
issued at least one trading day after the prior year’s earnings 
announcement date and last consensus earnings (cash flow) forecasts 
issued at least three trading days before the current year’s earnings 
announcement date 
 
Less: Firm-year observations with less than 20 trading days between the 
first and the last forecast dates  
 
Less: Firm-year observations in the utilities and financial services 
industries (i.e., SIC codes 49 and 60-67) 
 
Firm-year observations with both first and last consensus earnings  
(cash flow) forecasts between 1995 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66,951 
 
 
(478) 
 
 
(18,270) 
 
 
48,203 
 
 
 
 
11,728 
 
  
(148) 
 
 
(2,083) 
 
 
9,497 
 
Panel B: Sample selection for data analyses   
 
 
Firm-year observations with both earnings and cash flow forecast data 
 
8,978 
 
Less: Firm-year observations with missing variables from COMPUSTAT 
and I/B/E/S  
 
 
(4,625) 
 
Final firm-year observations for testing hypotheses 
 
4,353 
 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
1%. The sample consists of firm-year observations during the period 1995-2010.  
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables n Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
CXM 4,353 0.009 0.096 -0.011 0.000 0.018 
AXM 4,353 0.001 0.076 -0.011 -0.000 0.010 
CXM_OA 4,353 0.509 0.500 0 1 1 
ABCFOO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -0.595 -0.056 0.561 
ABACCO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -3.758 0.070 0.526 
ZSCORE 4,353 4.409 4.310 2.048 3.298 5.351 
INST 4,353 0.681 0.302 0.566 0.775 0.905 
MKSHARE 4,353 0.025 0.046 0.001 0.005 0.025 
BLOAT 4,353 1.197 1.289 0.443 0.778 1.449 
POSTSOX 4,353 0.939 0.239 1 1 1 
LIT 4,353 0.300 0.458 0 0 1 
RD 4,353 0.032 0.056 0 0 0.039 
ABCFEO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -0.483 -0.316 0.031 
ABAFEO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -0.224 -0.046 0.131 
CFOGRO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -0.276 -0.058 0.192 
ACCGRO 4,353 0.000 1.000 -0.190 -0.035 0.134 
PMBC 4,353 0.562 0.496 0 1 1 
PMBA 4,353 0.447 0.497 0 0 1 
FOLLOW 4,353 0.311 0.274 0.115 0.200 0.421 
EARN 4,353 0.046 0.105 0.019 0.058 0.098 
SIZE 4,353 8.172 1.700 7.046 8.163 9.340 
MB 4,353 3.087 3.218 1.545 2.446 3.915 
 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. The superscript “O” denotes orthogonalized variables.  
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TABLE 3 Pearson (Spearman) correlations (n = 4,353) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9 10 11 12 13 14 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1.CXM 1.00 -.60 .75 -.14 -.02 .01 -.04 -.04 .01 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.06 -.21 .01 -.07 .05 .04 -.17 -.10 -.09 
2.AXM -.61 1.00 -.69 .05 -.05 .02 .02 -.00 .02 -.03 .00 -.00 -.03 .10 .08 .07 .01 -.00 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.02 
3.CXM_OA .47 -.44 1.00 -.10 .02 -.01 -.02 -.00 .01 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.08 -.14 -.02 -.06 .04 .03 -.09 -.04 -.05 
4.ABCFOO -.12 .05 -.10 1.00 -.04 .38 .02 -.02 .08 .02 .17 .21 -.21 -.02 .31 .17 .01 .01 -.09 .50 .22 .34 
5.ABACCO -.04 -.07 -.00 -.00 1.00 .06 -.03 .08 .04 -.03 .02 .06 -.10 -.02 -.22 -.39 -.05 .05 -.00 .31 .14 .04 
6.ZSCORE .05 .01 -.01 .35 .05 1.00 .11 .06 -.35 .09 .25 .24 -.32 -.04 .07 .01 .03 -.01 -.26 .55 .16 .39 
7.INST -.03 .00 -.02 .04 .00 .09 1.00 -.05 -.15 .18 .09 .06 -.07 -.00 -.01 -.02 .03 -.02 -.19 .02 -.08 .01 
8.MKSHARE -.04 -.00 -.02 .01 .06 -.08 -.05 1.00 -.37 .09 -.10 .09 -.14 .01 -.02 -.04 .01 .02 -.25 .19 .68 .14 
9.BLOAT .02 .01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.15 -.17 -.18 1.00 -.14 -.18 -.10 -.00 -.02 .07 .10 -.02 .00 .28 -.26 -.12 -.21 
10.POSTSOX -.05 -.03 -.02 .02 -.03 .06 .19 .03 -.13 1.00 .13 .13 .00 .03 .01 -.03 .03 -.04 -.18 .10 .08 .06 
11.LIT -.04 .00 -.04 .20 .00 .24 .09 -.11 -.14 .13 1.00 .43 -.09 .02 .01 -.00 .04 -.02 -.45 .07 .07 .14 
12.RD -.01 .01 .00 .15 -.08 .23 .07 -.09 -.01 .11 .47 1.00 -.17 -.02 -.01 -.03 .04 -.01 -.36 .07 .14 .23 
13.ABCFEO .03 .00 -.01 -.18 -.07 -.19 -.15 -.08 .01 .01 -.03 -.04 1.00 -.16 -.04 -.04 -.02 .01 .16 -.26 -.28 -.27 
14.ABAFEO -.04 .04 -.04 -.04 -.06 -.04 -.04 -.02 .02 .01 -.01 -.04 .00 1.00 -.00 -.00 .01 -.03 -.09 -.07 -.04 -.03 
15.CFOGRO -.09 .04 -.07 .14 -.10 -.00 -.03 -.02 .01 .00 .01 -.02 .03 .02 1.00 .27 -.05 .05 .02 .23 .11 .13 
16.ACCGRO -.01 .04 -.00 .07 -.21 .01 -.01 -.01 .05 -.00 -.01 .02 -.02 -.02 -.00 1.00 -.02 .04 .00 -.12 .02 -.01 
17.PMBC -.05 .01 -.06 -.00 -.05 .02 .03 -.01 -.03 .03 .04 .05 -.03 .00 -.01 -.01 1.00 -.85 -.07 -.01 .02 .00 
18.PMBA .03 -.00 .04 .02 .05 -.01 -.03 .02 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.03 .01 -.03 .01 .01 -.85 1.00 .05 .04 .02 .01 
19.FOLLOW .06 -.03 .02 -.06 -.03 -.19 -.17 -.15 .38 -.19 -.40 -.29 .08 -.03 .02 .02 -.07 .03 1.00 -.09 -.20 -.19 
20.EARN -.14 -.04 -.07 .44 .55 .30 .04 .11 -.32 .06 .00 -.22 -.17 -.10 .08 -.14 -.03 .05 -.08 1.00 .40 .49 
21.SIZE -.14 -.03 -.05 .25 .18 .08 -.02 .50 -.19 .09 .08 -.03 -.25 -.08 .05 -.01 .02 .01 -.24 .39 1.00 .39 
22.MB -.03 -.00 -.04 .21 .02 .26 .03 .07 -.13 .04 .08 .11 -.15 -.01 .02 -.01 .00 .00 -.13 .25 .24 1.00 
Notes to Table 3: 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Pearson (Spearman) correlations appear 
below (above) the diagonal. Bolded correlations are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). The superscript “O” denotes orthogonalized 
variables.  
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Table 4: Test of downward cash flow expectation management determinants  
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (1) – OLS Regression 
DV = CXMt 
 Predicted sign                  Coeff.                            T-stat 
INTERCEPT ? 0.093*** 4.47 
Main Test Variables   
CFOGRO - -0.004** -2.57 
PMBC - -0.009*** -4.37 
ABCFEO - -0.001 -0.31 
ZSCORE ? 0.003*** 7.18 
INST ? -0.009*** -2.75 
MKSHARE ? 0.086** 2.28 
BLOAT ? -0.004*** -3.30 
POSTSOX ? -0.014 -1.23 
Control Variables   
FOLLOW ? -0.004 -0.29 
EARN ? -0.186*** -4.90 
SIZE ? -0.007*** -4.03 
MB ? 0.000 0.60 
LIT ? -0.009 -0.84 
RD ? -0.113*** -3.55 
ABCFOO - -0.001 -0.21 
ABACCO + 0.002 1.13 
AXM - -.776*** -16.51 
ACCGRO ? -0.001 -1.45 
ABAFEO ? -0.003 -0.89 
 n 4,353 
 R-squared  0.45 
   
Notes to Table 4: 
This table presents OLS regression results of Equation (1).  
CXMt = α0 +  α1CFOGROt + α2PMBCt  + α3ABCFEOt + α4ZSCOREt-1 + α5INSTt-1 +α6MKSHAREt-1 
       + α7BLOATt + α8POSTSOXt + α9FOLLOWt + α10EARNt + α11SIZEt  + α12MBt + α13LITt 
           + α14RDt-1 + α15ABCFOOt + α16ABACCOt + α17AXMt + α18ACCGROt + α19ABAFEOt + εt               
Eq.(1)                                                                                                                      
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th 
percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A.  
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Table 5: Test of downward accrual expectation management determinants  
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (2) – OLS Regression 
DV = AXMt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. T-stat 
INTERCEPT ? 0.063*** 3.84 
Main Test Variables   
ACCGRO - 0.000 0.31 
PMBA - 0.003* 1.76 
ABAFEO - 0.000 0.01 
ZSCORE ? 0.002*** 5.08 
INST ? -0.005* -1.80 
MKSHARE ? 0.061** 2.16 
BLOAT ? -0.002* -1.84 
POSTSOX ? -0.014** -2.14 
Control variables   
FOLLOW ? -0.014 -1.50 
EARN ? -0.110*** -2.97 
SIZE ? -0.005** -2.53 
MB ? 0.000 0.03 
LIT ? -0.009 -0.97 
RD ? -0.068* -1.68 
ABCFOO + 0.003 1.36 
ABACCO - -0.001 -0.67 
CXM - -0.517*** -23.61 
ABCFEO ? -0.000 -0.25 
CFOGRO ? -0.000 -0.45 
 n 4,353 
 R-squared  0.42 
   
Notes to Table 5: 
This table presents OLS regression results of Equation (2).  
AXMt =  β0 + β1ACCGROt +  β2PMBAt  +  β3ABAFEOt +  β4ZSCOREt-1 +  β5INSTt-1 + β6MKSHAREt-1 
       +  β7BLOATt +  β8POSTSOXt +  β9FOLLOWt +  β10EARNt +  β11SIZEt  +  β12MBt +  β13LITt 
          +  β14RDt-1 +  β15ABCFOOt +  β16ABACCOt +  β17CXMt +  β18CFOGROt +  β19ABCFEOt + εt               
Eq.(2)                                                                                                                      
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White robust 
standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix A.  
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Test of the determinants of downward CXM over downward AXM  
 
 
Variable 
Eq.(3) - Logistic Regression 
DV = Prob (CXM_OA = 1)t 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? 0.330 1.17  
Main Test Variables    
CFOGRO - -0.104*** -3.14 -0.03 
PMBC  - -0.242*** -3.78 -0.06 
ABCFEO - -0.074 -1.57 -0.02 
ZSCORE ? 0.021*** 3.65 0.01 
INST ? -0.131* -1.94 -0.03 
MKSHARE ? -1.311 -1.61 -0.32 
BLOAT ? -0.061*** -2.79 -0.01 
POSTSOX ? -0.117 -0.57 -0.03 
ACCGRO + -0.011 -0.58 -0.00 
ABAFEO + -0.086* -1.95 -0.02 
Control Variables    
FOLLOW ? 0.360** 2.16 0.09 
EARN ? -1.506** -2.54 -0.36 
SIZE ? 0.008 0.28 0.00 
MB ? -0.008 -0.78 -0.00 
LIT ? -0.191* -1.74 -0.05 
RD ? 0.393 0.54 0.10 
ABCFOO - -0.157*** -4.22 -0.04 
ABACCO + 0.046 0.94 0.01 
 2 Log Likelihood -2947.125 
 Chi-Square 138.781 
 P-value .000 
 Pseudo R2 .04 
 Correctly classified 56.60% 
 n 4,353 
 n (CXM_OA = 1) 2,217 
 n (CXM_OA= 0) 2,136 
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Notes to Table 6: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (3).  
Prob (CXM_OA = 1)t = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1CFOGROt + 𝛿2PMBCt + 𝛿3ABCFEOt + 𝛿4ZSCOREt-1 + 𝛿5INSTt-1  
                                   + 𝛿6MKSHAREt-1 + 𝛿7BLOATt  +  𝛿8POSTSOXt + 𝛿9ACCGROt + 𝛿10ABAFEOt 
                                                       + 𝛿11FOLLOWt + 𝛿12EARNt + 𝛿13SIZEt  + 𝛿14MBt+ 𝛿15LITt + 𝛿16RDt-1 
                                                       + 𝛿17ABCFOOt + 𝛿18ABACCOt + εt                                                             Eq.(3)                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                        
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year.   
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White robust 
standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall average change in 
probability that firms are more likely to engage in downward cash flow than downward accrual 
expectations management when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from 
zero to one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 7: Logistic regression analyses for H1 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (4) – Logistic Regression 
DV = DCXMt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? 1.705*** 3.17  
Main Test Variables 
CFOGRO - -0.137*** -4.30 -0.03 
PMBC - -0.329*** -4.57 -0.07 
ABCFEO - -0.121** -2.15 -0.02 
ZSCORE ? 0.078*** 6.15 0.02 
INST ? -0.344*** -3.26 -0.07 
MKSHARE ? -0.420 -0.46 -0.09 
BLOAT ? -0.097*** -3.43 -0.02 
POSTSOX ? -0.554* -1.70 -0.11 
Control Variables 
FOLLOW ? 0.050 0.14 0.01 
EARN ? -5.337*** -3.50 -1.09 
SIZE ? -0.068 -1.31 -0.01 
MB ? -0.014 -0.77 -0.00 
LIT ? -0.236*** -2.92 -0.05 
RD ? -1.668 -1.25 -0.34 
ABCFOO - -0.083 -1.50 -0.02 
ABACCO + 0.082 1.15 0.02 
AXM - -15.749*** -6.21 -3.21 
ACCGRO ? 0.005 0.14 0.00 
ABAFEO ? -0.084 -0.83 -0.02 
     
 2 Log Likelihood -2558.440 
 Chi-Square   914.726 
 P-value  0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.25 
 Correctly classified 70.80% 
 n  4,353 
 n (DCXM = 1) 2,233 
 n (DCXM = 0) 2,120 
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Notes to Table 7: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (4).  
Prob(DCXMt) = θ0 +  θ1CFOGROt + θ2PMBCt  + θ3ABCFEOt + θ4ZSCOREt-1 + θ5INSTt-1   
              + θ6MKSHAREt-1+ θ7BLOATt + θ8POSTSOXt + θ9FOLLOWt + θ10EARNt + θ11SIZEt   
              + θ12MBt + θ13LITt + θ14RDt-1 + θ15ABCFOOt + θ16ABACCOt + θ17AXMt + θ18ACCGROt  
                      + θ19ABAFEOt + εt               
Eq.(4)                                                                                                                      
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th 
percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall 
average change in probability that firms are likely to engage in downward cash flow expectations 
management when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to 
one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 8: Logistic regression analyses for H2 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (5) – Logistic Regression 
DV = DAXMt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? 1.269*** 2.86  
Main Test Variables 
ACCGRO - 0.019 0.87 0.00 
PMBA - -0.003 -0.06 -0.00 
ABAFEO - 0.053 0.96 0.01 
ZSCORE ? 0.049*** 6.82 0.01 
INST ? -0.027 -0.40 -0.01 
MKSHARE ? 2.804*** 2.83 0.60 
BLOAT ? -0.014 -0.41 -0.00 
POSTSOX ? -0.361* -1.94 -0.08 
Control Variables 
FOLLOW ? -0.431** -2.59 -0.09 
EARN ? -2.708*** -3.64 -0.58 
SIZE ? -0.093** -2.06 -0.02 
MB ? -0.005 -0.42 -0.00 
LIT ? 0.042 0.24 0.01 
RD ? -2.632*** -4.04 -0.56 
ABCFOO + 0.097* 1.93 0.02 
ABACCO - 0.037 0.67 0.01 
CXM - -13.617*** -7.17 -2.90 
ABCFEO ? 0.035 0.97 0.01 
CFOGRO ? -0.028 -1.18 -0.01 
     
 2 Log Likelihood -2644.341 
 Chi-Square 745.111 
 P-value  0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.21 
 Correctly classified 69.70% 
 n  4,353 
 n (DAXM = 1) 2,148 
 n (DAXM = 0) 2,205 
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Notes to Table 8: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (8).  
Prob(DAXMt) =  ν0 + ν1ACCGROt + ν2PMBAt  + ν3ABAFEOt + ν4ZSCOREt-1 + ν5INSTt-1  
              + ν6MKSHAREt-1+ ν7BLOATt + ν8POSTSOXt + ν9FOLLOWt + ν10EARNt + ν11SIZEt   
              +  ν12MBt + ν13LITt+ ν14RDt-1 + ν15ABCFOOt + ν16ABACCOt + ν17CXMt + ν18CFOGROt  
                      +  ν19ABCFEOt + εt               
                                                                                                                                    Eq.(5)                                                                                                                      
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th 
percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall 
average change in probability that firms are likely to engage in downward accrual expectations 
management when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to 
one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 9: Logistic regression analyses for H1  
(Alternative measure of CXM) 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (6) – Logistic Regression 
DV = CXMMATt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? 0.403 0.54  
Main Test Variables 
CFOGRO - -0.189*** -2.80 -0.04 
PMBC - -0.188** -2.53 -0.04 
ABCFEO - -0.097*** -3.05 -0.02 
ZSCORE ? 0.074** 2.52 0.01 
INST ? -0.182 -0.82 -0.04 
MKSHARE ? -2.404* -1.87 -0.47 
BLOAT ? -0.140** -2.39 -0.03 
POSTSOX ? -0.315 -0.71 -0.06 
Control Variables 
FOLLOW ? 0.047 0.13 0.01 
EARN ? -7.576*** -2.83 -1.48 
SIZE ? 0.035 0.77 0.01 
MB ? 0.013 0.73 0.00 
LIT ? -0.040 -0.18 -0.01 
RD ? -3.171*** -7.19 -0.62 
ABCFOO - -0.003 -0.05 -0.00 
ABACCO + 0.180* 1.87 0.04 
AXM - -0.599*** -5.54 -0.12 
ACCGRO ? 0.009 0.54 0.00 
ABAFEO ? 0.033 0.38 0.01 
     
 2 Log Likelihood -1437.152 
 Chi-Square 617.985 
 P-value  0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.29 
 Correctly classified 72.28% 
 n  2,525 
 n (CXMMAT = 1) 1,334 
 n (CXMMAT = 0) 1,191 
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Notes to Table 9: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (6).  
Prob(CXMMATt) = ω0 + ω1CFOGROt + ω2PMBCt  + ω3ABCFEOt + ω4ZSCOREt-1 + ω5INSTt-1  
          + ω6MKSHAREt-1 + ω7BLOATt + ω8POSTSOXt + ω9FOLLOWt + ω10EARNt + ω11SIZEt   
          + ω12MBt + ω13LITt + ω14RDt-1 + ω15ABCFOOt + ω16ABACCOt + ω17AXMt + ω18ACCGROt  
                +  ω19ABAFEOt + εt               
Eq.(6)                                                                                                                      
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th 
percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall 
average change in probability that firms are likely to engage in downward cash flow expectations 
management when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to 
one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 10: Logistic regression analyses for H2 
(Alternative measure of AXM) 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (7) – Logistic Regression 
DV = AXMMATt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? -1.512*** -2.89  
Main Test Variables 
ACCGRO - 0.043** 2.33 0.01 
PMBA - 0.194 1.46 0.04 
ABAFEO - -0.006 -0.15 -0.00 
ZSCORE ? 0.030 1.47 0.01 
INST ? 0.362** 2.14 0.07 
MKSHARE ? -1.867 -1.35 -0.36 
BLOAT ? 0.040*** 3.17 0.01 
POSTSOX ? -0.827*** -3.18 -0.16 
Control Variables 
FOLLOW ? -0.231 -0.85 -0.04 
EARN ? -2.699** -2.53 -0.52 
SIZE ? 0.133** 2.52 0.03 
MB ? -0.002 -0.19 -0.00 
LIT ? 0.319* 1.94 0.06 
RD ? -1.277 -1.02 -0.25 
ABCFOO + 0.163** 2.44 0.03 
ABACCO - 0.063 1.14 0.01 
CXM - -0.682*** -6.77 -0.13 
ABCFEO ? 0.152* 1.86 0.03 
CFOGRO ? -0.115** -2.49 -0.02 
     
 2 Log Likelihood -1417.128 
 Chi-Square 653.437 
 P-value  0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.31 
 Correctly classified 72.36% 
 n  2,525 
 n (AXMMAT = 1) 1,173 
 n (AXMMAT = 0) 1,352 
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Notes to Table 10: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (7).  
Prob(AXMMATt) =  γ0 + γ1ACCGROt + γ2PMBAt  + γ3ABAFEOt + γ4ZSCOREt-1 + γ5INSTt-1  
              + γ6MKSHAREt-1+ γ7BLOATt + γ8POSTSOXt + γ9FOLLOWt + γ10EARNt + γ11SIZEt   
              +  γ12MBt + γ13LITt+ γ14RDt-1 + γ15ABCFOOt + γ16ABACCOt + γ17CXMt + γ18CFOGROt  
                      +  γ19ABCFEOt + εt               
                                                                                                                                    Eq.(7)                                                                                                                      
 
Fixed industry effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. P-values are based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th 
percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal effect represents the overall 
average change in probability that firms are likely to engage in downward accrual expectations 
management when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to 
one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 11: Replication of DeFond and Hung (2003)  
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (8) – Logistic Regression 
DV = CFIt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat Marginal effect 
INTERCEPT ? -5.307*** -43.31  
ACC + 0.735*** 2.67 0.14 
COMPACC - -5.037*** -5.25 -0.94 
VOL + 0.008** 2.06 0.00 
CAPINT + 0.262*** 14.78 0.05 
ZSCORE - -0.037*** -7.53 -0.01 
SIZE ? 0.705*** 46.88 0.13 
 2 Log Likelihood -7000.127 
 Chi-Square 3632.334 
 P-value  0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.33 
 Correctly classified 72.41% 
 n  12,721 
 n (CFI = 1) 6,272 
 n (CFI= 0) 6,449 
   
Notes to Table 11: 
This table presents logistic regression results of Equation (4).  
Prob(CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt  + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1 + λ5ZSCOREt-1  
                   + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt 
Eq.(8)                                                                                                                      
 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Marginal 
effect represents the overall average change in probability that firms have both earnings and cash 
flow forecasts when the continuous X variables increase by one unit or when moving from zero to 
one value for the dummy X variables. 
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Table 12: Heckman two-stage analyses for H1 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (10) OLS model – Step 2 of Heckman procedure 
DV = CXMt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat 
INTERCEPT ? 0.115*** 3.23 
Main Test Variables   
CFOGRO - -0.007*** -4.84 
PMBC - -0.011*** -4.09 
ABCFEO - 0.003 1.63 
ZSCORE ? 0.004*** 8.38 
INST ? -0.002 -0.40 
MKSHARE ? 0.021 0.50 
BLOAT ? -0.002 -1.58 
POSTSOX ? -0.057** -2.59 
Control Variables   
FOLLOW ? -0.023** -2.39 
EARN ? -0.204*** -7.67 
SIZE ? -0.004* -1.76 
MB ? -0.000 -0.74 
LIT ? -0.007 -0.96 
RD ? -0.186*** -4.81 
ABCFOO - 0.002 1.03 
ABACCO + 0.002 1.16 
AXM - -0.792*** -40.64 
ACCGRO ? -0.004*** -3.20 
ABAFEO ? -0.004** -2.39 
IMR ? -0.006 -0.74 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (9) Probit model – Step 1 of Heckman procedure 
DV = CFIt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat 
INTERCEPT ? -4.344*** -46.86 
ACC + 1.091*** 5.19 
COMPACC - -5.950*** -8.18 
VOL + -0.000 -0.07 
CAPINT + 0.148*** 11.29 
ZSCORE - -0.019*** -4.99 
SIZE ? 0.476*** 44.74 
    
  n 8,868 
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Notes to Table 12: 
This table presents Heckman two-stage results for H1 
Step 1 of Heckman procedure: Probit regression  
Prob(CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt  + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1 + λ5ZSCOREt-1 + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt 
        
                                                                                                                                             Eq.(9)                                                                                                                      
Step 2 of Heckman procedure: OLS regression  
CXMt = µ0 +  µ1CFOGROt + µ2PMBCt  + µ3ABCFEOt + µ4ZSCOREt-1 + µ5INSTt-1 + µ6MKSHAREt-1 
       + µ7BLOATt + µ8POSTSOXt + µ9FOLLOWt + µ10EARNt + µ11SIZEt  + µ12MBt + µ13LITt 
           + µ14RDt-1 + µ15ABCFOOt + µ16ABACCOt + µ17AXMt + µ18ACCGROt + µ19ABAFEOt + µ20IMRt + εt               
                                                                                                                                              Eq.(10)                                                                                                                      
 
                                                                                                                        
Fixed year and industry effects are included.*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix A. 
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Table 13: Heckman two-stage analyses for H2 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (12) OLS model – Step 2 of Heckman procedure 
DV = AXMt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat 
INTERCEPT ? 0.028 1.37 
Main Test Variables   
ACCGRO - -0.002* -1.74 
PMBA - 0.005** 2.19 
ABAFEO - 0.001 0.89 
ZSCORE ? 0.002*** 5.30 
INST ? -0.004 -0.89 
MKSHARE ? 0.009 0.34 
BLOAT ? -0.000 -0.04 
POSTSOX ? -0.003 -0.43 
Control Variables   
FOLLOW ? -0.015*** -3.07 
EARN ? -0.132*** -6.77 
SIZE ? -0.002 -0.86 
MB ? -0.000 -0.65 
LIT ? -0.008*** -2.63 
RD ? -0.098*** -3.57 
ABCFOO + 0.006*** 3.96 
ABACCO - 0.002 1.31 
CXM - -0.509*** -40.27 
ABCFEO ? 0.003** 2.15 
CFOGRO ? -0.001 -1.14 
IMR ? 0.001 0.10 
 
 
Variable 
Eq. (11) Probit model – Step 1 of Heckman procedure 
DV = CFIt 
 Predicted sign Coeff. Z-stat 
INTERCEPT ? -4.344*** -46.86 
ACC + 1.091*** 5.19 
COMPACC - -5.950*** -8.18 
VOL + -0.000 -0.07 
CAPINT + 0.148*** 11.29 
ZSCORE - -0.019*** -4.99 
SIZE ? 0.476*** 44.74 
    
  n 8,868 
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Notes to Table 13: 
This table presents Heckman two-stage results for H2 
Step 1 of Heckman procedure: Probit regression  
Prob(CFIt) = λ0 + λ1ACCt-1 + λ2COMPACCt  + λ3VOLt + λ4CAPINTt-1 + λ5ZSCOREt-1 + λ6SIZEt-1 + εt 
        
                                                                                                                                             Eq.(11)                                                                                                                      
Step 2 of Heckman procedure: OLS regression  
AXMt =  φ0 + φ1ACCGROt + φ2PMBAt  + φ3ABAFEOt + φ4ZSCOREt-1 + φ5INSTt-1 + φ6MKSHAREt-1 
       +  φ7BLOATt + φ8POSTSOXt + φ9FOLLOWt + φ10EARNt + φ11SIZEt  + φ12MBt + φ13LITt 
           +  φ14RDt-1 + φ15ABCFOOt + φ16ABACCOt + φ17CXMt + φ18CFOGROt + φ19ABCFEOt + φ20IMRt + εt               
                                                                                                                                              Eq.(12)                                                                                                                      
 
                                                                                                                        
Fixed year and industry effects are included.*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% two-sided p-values. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix A. 
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